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WHO SHOULD CONTROL THE DECISION TO CALL A
WITNESS: RESPECTING A CRIMINAL DEFENDANT'S
TACTICAL CHOICES
RodneyJ. Uphoff*
I. INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM IN CONTEXT
A law student approached me not long ago to discuss a problem he
had encountered while helping to prepare a criminal case for retrial.'
The defendant's first trial ended with a hung jury. The defendant,
Steven Brown, now faced a second trial on the same misdemeanor
charge of assaulting a police officer.' Although the defendant still
wanted to go to trial, Brown told defense counsel that he did not want
his elderly father to have to testify again. From defense counsel's
standpoint, the father's testimony was critical because he was the only
witness corroborating the defendant's version of the event. Moreover,
in talking to members of thejury after the hung verdict, counsel learned
that the jurors viewed the defendant's testimony as largely incredible,
but found Brown's father to be very believable. Thus, counsel
concluded-and so informed her client-that the defendant's chances
for an acquittal at trial would be greatly reduced if his father did not
testify.
Seemingly aware he was hurting his own defense, Brown insisted,
nonetheless, that he did not want to put his father through the stress of
another trial. Brown told his lawyer that he was prepared to take his
chances at trial without his father's testimony. Concerned by her client's
insistence on an unsound strategic course that defense counsel felt was
contrary to Brown's best interest because it compromised the strength
of their defense, counsel tried to persuade Brown to change his mind.'
* Professor and Director of Clinical Ugal Education, University of Oklahoma College of Lw.
I would like to thank Don Bogan, PeterJoy and Carrie Hempel for their comments and criticisms. I would
also like to thank Kim Marchant and Lori Ketner for their assistance in the preparation of this article.
1. The student vas enrolled in the Criminal Defense Clinic, a clinical course that I direct at the
University of Oklahoma College of Lw. The students in this course work with an experienced criminal
defense lawycr/clinical supervisor to provide representation to indigent defendants in Oklahoma state court
proceedings.
2. The defendant's name and some of the facts have been changed to maintain'the client's
confidentiality. For a thought-provoking look at the problems involved in using clients' stories for teaching
purposes, see Nina W. Tarr, Clients' and Students' Stories: Avoiding Evploitation and Compying With the Law to
Produce Scholarship With Integrity, 5 CLINICAL L. REV. 271 (1998).
3. Defense counsel's attempt to persuade Brown to rethink his decision and to allow counsel to call
Brown's father as a witness was, given the facts of this case, appropriate lawyering. See STANDARDS FOR
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When that failed, counsel suggested that the student discuss with me
whether she or the client ultimately controlled the decision to call the
father to testify.
Much to his chagrin-and, perhaps, to his surprise4 -- the student
quickly learned that I had no simple answer to his seemingly straightfor-
ward inquiry. As he would soon discover, lawyers, courts, and commen-
tators are sharply divided as to whom should have the final say when
lawyer and criminal defendant disagree regarding the decision to call a
particular witness.' In the absence of a strong professional 'consensus
regarding the proper allocation of decisionmaking power in the
attorney-client relationship, criminal practitioners are given consider-
able latitude to decide for themselves how to resolve decisionmaking
disputes with their clients. Most lawyers tend to approach such disputes
from a particular lawyering orientation or style,' and that orientation
shapes their resolution of such a dispute. Regardless of one's
decisionmaking orientation, however, the criminal defense lawyer
locked in a disagreement with a client over a strategic decision
eventually will be forced to make a tough judgment call, a call that
necessarily implicates important client values.
This article seeks to highlight the difficulty facing defense counsel by
examining three variations of the strategic impasse that counsel faced in
the Brown case. In each scenario, the criminal practitioner confronts a
variation of the same dilemma: whether to call Brown's father as a
witness or to defer to the client's unsound tactical choice that his father
not testify. Ultimately, defense counsel must decide in each scenario
whether to respect Brown's right to be wrong or to override the
defendant's choice for Brown's own good.
Before turning to. the three scenarios, the article begins by examining
the traditional view of the proper allocation of decisionmaking
CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION Standard 4-5.2 commentary at
201 (3d ed. 1993) [hereinafter STANDARDS FOR CRIMINALJUSTIcE] ("Although it is highly improper for
counsel to demand that the defendant follow what counsel perceives as the desirable course or for counsel
to coerce a client's decision through misrepresentation or undue influence, counsel is free to engage in fair
persuasion and to urge the client to follow proffered professional advice"). See also infra notes 216, 235 and
accompanying text.
4. Students in the clinic, especially early in the semester, often are surprised at my failure to offer
them simple answers to their inquiries. My explanation is that the resolution ofquestions about lawyering
frequently turns on subtle distinctions, factual nuances, and conflicting values that require extensive
discussion rather than a pat answer. Additionally, even ifI have a pat answer, I generally want the student
to struggle with the problem first before disclosing my position. For the pedigogicaljustifications for this
approach to supervision,. see David F. Chavkin, Am I My Client's Lawyer?: Role Definition and the Clinical
Supervisor, 51 SMU L. REV. 1507, 1527-35 (1998).
5. See infra notes 35-38, 64-197 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
HeinOnline  -- 68 U. Cin. L. Rev. 764 1999-2000
2000] RESPECTING A DEFADANT'S TACTICAL CHOICES 765
responsibility between lawyer and client. Section II discusses how a
criminal defense lawyer adhering to this traditional approach would be
likely to respond to the dilemma in the Brown case. Section II also
describes the client-centered approach to lawyering and explores how
that lawyering orientation influences counsel's resolution of such- a
dispute. Section III discusses the general, and often inconsistent,
guidance provided by ethical rules, caselaw, and professional norms
regarding the allocation of decisionmaking power between lawyer and
criminal defendant.7 Occasionally, criminal defense lawyers are
provided specific directives as to how particular disputes with their
clients over strategy are to be resolved.' For the most part, however,
neither the Constitution nor the courts mandate that lawyers follow the
strategic commands of their clients or dictate that lawyers disregard
those commands. Rather, criminal defense lawyers generally are given
broad discretion to determine whether-and to what extent-they will
share or cede control over a strategic decision to a defendant.'"
Exercising that broad discretion wisely, however, is not easy. As the
Brown case illustrates, the criminal practitioner entangled in a strategic
impasse with a client must make a demanding judgment call. To assist
lawyers confronting such dilemmas, Section III outlines an approach
that calls for defense counsel to weigh four factors before deciding to
respect or to override a client's strategic choice: the defendant's
7. See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE &JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 559-60 (1992)
(noting the uncertainty as to which decisions ultimately are for counsel and which are for the client and
concluding that "[t]he problems of uncertainty are exacerbated, however, by the absence of any well
reasoned guidelines for distinguishing between those decisions requiring defendant's personal choice and
those subject to counsel's control over strategy"); Trimble v. State, 693 S.W.2d 267, 279 (Mo. Ct. App.
1985) (after reviewing mixed guidance of ethical rules, ABA Standards and caselaw regarding strategic
decisionmaking, lamenting "the continuing difficulty in determining defense counsel's role in the criminal
trial").
8. See, e.g., State v. Ali, 407 S.E.2d 183, 189 (N.C. 1991) (holding that if defense counsel and
defendant reach an absolute impasse over strategic decision regarding use of peremptory challenge,
defendant's wishes control).
9. See infra notes 64-182 and accompanying text. Lawyers are not authorized to follow a client's
instructions when by doing so, counsel would be assisting a client-or participating-in conduct that the
lawyer knows to be criminal or fraudulent. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-
102(A)(7) (1980); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 1.2(d)(1 989); Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S.
157 (1986). Thus, defense counsel faces a difficult ethical dilemma when her client insists that she call a
witness that counsel reasonably believes will testify falsely on the stand. Compare State v. Hagen, 574
N.W.2d 585 (N.D. 1998), and People v. Schultheis, 638 P.2d 8 (Colo. 1980), with Donald Liskov, Criminal
Defendant Perjuy: A Lauyer's Choice Between Ethics, the Constitution, and the Truth, 28 NEW ENG. L. REV. 881
(1994), and MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS ETHICS 123-24(1990). This article does
not address a lawyer's responsibility when confronted with such a dilemma. Rather, for the purpose of this
article, assume that counsel in Brown and the three variations of the Brown case lacks any reasonable basis
for believing that Brown or his father will testify falsely.
10. See infra notes 40-182 and accompanying text.
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capacity for choice, the reasons for the defendant's preferred strategy,
the harm the defendant faces, and the likelihood of the defendant
suffering that harm if counsel respects the defendant's wishes. Section
IV concludes by exploring the utility of this suggested approach in three
variations of the Brown dilemma.
II. LAWYER-CENTERED VERSUS CLIENT-CENTERED
DECISIONMAKING: DIFFERING VIEWS OF LAWYER-CLIENT
DECISIONMAKING RESPONSIBILITY
A. The Traditional Approach
For some lawyers-especially among those who adhere to the
traditional view of the lawyer-client relationship-the issue posed by the
Brown case presents no serious dilemma. According to this traditional
view of lawyering, the client chooses the goals or the objectives of the
representation while the lawyer selects the means to achieve the client's
ends." Once the client has retained a lawyer, or agreed to accept
appointed counsel, the client's role is largely passive. 2 The lawyer, as
a trusted and skilled professional, utilizes her training and specialized
knowledge to manage the client's legal problem or case in accordance
with counsel's best judgment. Thus, except for a few fundamental
decisions specifically reserved for the defendant," the criminal defense
lawyer makes all tactical and strategic decisions, including which
witnesses to call, because the lawyer, as a detached expert, is in a better
position to do so than the untrained, emotionally involved client. 4
11. The traditional view as articulated byJustice Burger in decisions such as Wainwright v. Sykes, 433
U.S. 72, 93-94 (1977) (Burger, CJ., concurring) and Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 750-54 (1983), places
almost all decisionmaking power and responsibility in the hands ofdefense counsel, the skilled profissional,
who is to use her expertise to manage her client's case. Although commentators use a variety of terms to
describe the lawyer's role in the traditional approach to the lawyer-client relationship, generally the
lawyer/manager is depicted as the master while the pliant, needful client is portrayed as the servant. See,
e.g., Vivian 0. Berger, The Supreme Court and Defense Counsel Old Roa, Na Paths -A Dead End?, 86 COLUM.
L. REV. 9, 33-37 (1986). For a more detailed look at the traditional approach, see DOUGLAS E.
ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN CHARGE (1974); DAVID A. BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS
COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH 16-18 (1991); THOMAS L. SHAFFER & ROBERT F.
COCHRANJR., LAWYERS, CLIENTS, AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 5-14, 30-39 (1994).
12. See Watts v. Singletary, &7 F.3d 1282, 1288 (1 1th Cir. 1996) (attributing a very limited role to
the defendant in tactical decisionmaking).
13. The decisions consistently deemed to be ultimately reserved for the defendant include: whether
to plead guilty, whether to accept a plea agreement, whether to waive ajury trial, whether to testify, and
whether to appeal. See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINALJUSTICE Standard 4-5.2 (3d ed. 1993); MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(a) (1989); Jones, 463 U.S. at 750.
14. Unquestionably, a significant number of lawyers agree with former ABA president Chesterfield
Smith that the lawyer as professional must take charge ofthe case and make all strategic decisions: "Clients
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Moreover, the lawyer has the right-indeed the responsibility-to make
all tactical decisions because the nature of the trial process simply does
not allow time for consultation, much less informed client
decisionnaking.-5
To the traditionalist, therefore, once Brown accepted appointed
counsel, he expressly agreed that his lawyer could use her bestjudgment
to handle his defense. 16  Accordingly, because counsel reasonably
believes that the father's testimony will aid the defense case, counsel is
empowered to call Brown's father to the witness stand despite Brown's
objection. 7 This approach to decisionmaking, therefore, is lawyer-
centered because it maximizes lawyer autonomy by providing counsel
the authority to make the strategic decisions she deems necessary to
attain the results counsel believes are in the client's best interests. 8
before long get great confidence in me and they don't want me to tell them all of the alternatives. They
want me to tell them what to do. I do it and charge them." Panel Discussion, A Cathering of Legal Scholars
to Discuss "Professional Responsibility and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct," 35 U. MIAMI L. REV. 639, 643
(1981). For a sampling of others advocating the traditional approach, see, e.g., Clement F. Haynsworth,Jr.,
Professionalism in Lawyeng, 27 S.C. L. REV. 627 (1976); F. LEE BAILEY & HENRY B. ROTHBLA'r,
FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL ADVOCACY §58, at 44 (1974); Abe Fortas, Thunnan Arnold and the Theatre
ofthe Law, 79 YALE LJ. 988, 996 (1970); Samuel C. Stretton, Trial Tactics and Strateg - Who Controls It, The
Attorny or the Client?, THE CHAMPION, May 1992, at 25-26.
15. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72,93-94 (1977) (Burger, CJ., concurring) (placing ultimate
responsibility for strategic and tactical decisions with the lawyer, without need for consultation, in part,
because of nature of trial process).
16. See, e.g., People v. Hamilton, 774 P.2d 730,741 (Cal. 1989) (en bane) ("By choosing professional
representation, the accused surrenders all but a handful of 'fundamental' personal rights to counsel's
complete control of defense strategies and tactics."). For a more critical look at the claim that a client's
initial consent to representation justifies sweeping lawyer control over all strategic decisions, see Mark
Spiegel, Lawyering and Client Deciiionmaking: Inforned Consent and the Legal Profession, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 41,77
(1979); BINDER ET AL., supra note 11, at 268; David Luban, Paternalism and the Legal Profession, 1981 WIS.
L. REV. 454, 458-59.
17. In rejecting the defendant's appeal based on his court-appointed lawyer's decision to override
his client's strategic wishes, the court inNetlson v. State, 346 F.2d 73 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 964
(1965) summarized the arguments for lawyer control over deicisionmaking:
Does the fact that here there was prior consultation with the accused, and that he disagreed
with counsel's strategy, make a legal difference?... Our view is that the result should be
the same. Our reasons are that only counsel is competent to make such a decision, that
counsel must be the manager of the law-suit [sic], that ifsuch decisions are to be made by
the defendant, he is likely to do himself more harm than good, and that a contrary rule
would seriously impair the constitutional guaranty ofthe right to counsel. One ofthe surest
ways for counsel to lose a law-suit [sic] is to permit his client to run the trial. We think that
few competent counsel would accept retainers, . . . if they were to have to consult the
defendant, and follow his views, on every issue of trial strategy.
Id. at 81.
18. As David Luban has written, "a lawyer's manipulating a case or client for the client's own good -
or, rather, for what the lawyer takes to be the client's own good even though the client does not see it that
way.., is called paternalism." Luban, supra note 16, at 458. For an in-depth discussion ofpaternalism and
the extent to which a lawyer's paternalism may be justified, see generally Luban, supra note 16.
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B. Client-Centered Lawyering
The participatory or client-centered model 9 represents a very
different approach to lawyering. The role of the client-centered lawyer
is to help the client identify legal problems, to develop viable options
consistent with the client's goals, and to present the advantages and
disadvantages of each option so that the client ultimately can select a
course of action that is consistent with the client's chosen goals."0 The
client-centered lawyer initiates a counseling process that requires the
client to take an active role both in defining his interests and in
establishing his priorities as well as in making all fundamental decisions
that are likely to have a substantial legal or nonlegal impact on the client
or his case." t The client-centered model seeks to promote client
19. Although there are many variations of the client-centered approach, those commentators who
espouse such a model of lawyering are critical of the lawyer-dominated traditional view of the attorney-
client relationship and argue instead for a more balanced relationship in which lawyers interact with their
clients in a manner that fosters greater client decisionmaking. For a look at a representative sample of
different proponents of a client-centered approach, see ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR., ET AL., THE
COUNSELOR-AT-LAW: A COLLABORATIVE APPROACH TO CLIENT INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING
(1999); DAVID LUIBAN, LAWYERS ANDJUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY (1988); ROSENTHAL, supra note 11;
Robert D. Dinerstein, Client-Centered Counseling. Reappraisal and Refunent, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 501 (1990);
Stephen Ellmann, Lawyers and Clients, 34 UCLAL. REV. 717 (1987); Binny Miller, Give Them Back TheirLives:
Recognizing Client Narrative in Case Theogy, 93 MICH L. REV. 485 (1994); John K. Morris, Power and
Responsibility Among Layers and Clients: Comment on Ellmann's Lawyers and Clients, 34 UCLA L. REV. 781
(1987); Stephen L. Pepper, Counseling at the. Limits of the Law: An Evercise in the urisprudence and Ethics of
Lwyering, 104 YALE L.J. 1545 (1995); Spiegel, supra note 16; Marcy Strauss, Toward a Revised Model of
Attorne-Client Relationship. The Argumentfor Autonomy, 65 N.C. L. REV. 315 (1987).
20. See BINDER ETAL., supra note 11, at 290-308, 316-46. Arguably, the client-centered model's
most influential proponents are David Binder and Susan Price, whose first book, LEGAL INTERVIEWING
AND COUNSELING: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH (1977), was the most widely used text on legal
interviewing and counseling in legal education. Joined by their colleague Paul Bergman, Binder and Price
authored a revised text, LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT CENTERED APPROACH, supra note 11,
which continues to enjoy widespread use. The Binder, Bergman and Price model, nonetheless, has its
critics including others favoring a client-centered approach. See, e.g., Ellmann, supra note 19; Robert F.
Cochran,Jr., LegalRepresentation andthe Neat Steps Toward Client Controb Attorney Aledpracticefor the Failure toAllow
the Client to Control Negotiation and Pursue Alternaties to Litigation, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 819 (1990); AlexJ.
Hurder, Negotiating the iawzyer-Client Relitionship: A SearchforEqualit
, 
and Collaboration, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 71
(1996). For an excellent overview of the arguments for and against the client-centered approach to legal
counseling and decisionmaking together with an assessment of the strengths and limitations of the Binder
and Price model, see generally Dinerstein, supra note 19.
21. According to Binder, Bergman and Price, the client should make any decision when a lawyer,
using "such skill, prudence, and diligence as other members of the profession commonly possess and
exercise," would or should know that such a decision is likely to have a substantial legal or nonlegal impact
on a client. See BINDER ETAL., supra note 11, at 268 (citation omitted). Although this "substantial impact"
standard does extend client decisionmaking to include some strategic or tactical issues, the standard has
been rightfully criticized as vague and as offering little real guidance to lawyers trying to determine which
decisions really belong to the client. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 19, at 511-14; Hurder, supra note 20, at 77-
80. Indeed, the standard proposed by Binder, Bergman and Price relegates virtually all strategic and
tactical decisionmaking to the lawyer, albeit with the need to consult with the client in many such decisions.
Requiring only consultation, however, substantially reduces the force or sweep of client-centered
decisionmaking.
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autonomy by making clients responsible for decisionmaking. This
approach, however, goes further than just recognizing that most clients
are competent decisionmakers. Rather, this model assumes that clients
often are in a better position to make case decisions because so many
decisions actually turn on the client's values and priorities that the client
alone best appreciates.22 The lawyer's role in this model, then, is to
provide clients with meaningful information so as to empower clients to
make informed choices about their cases.23
Client centered lawyers still are called upon to utilize their
professional judgment to make many tactical and strategic decisions.
Commentators advocating the client-centered approach recognize that
lawyers must be provided the professional discretion to make numerous
tactical decisions--such as how to question a witness, what to include in
a closing argument, or whether to make an evidentiary objection-
without the client's consent or input.24 Time, common sense, and
respect for professional autonomy preclude the client from making all
of the myriad decisions involved in a criminal case. 25 Although client-
centered advocates generally agree that clients must be given the
opportunity to make all significant case decisions, client-centered
theorists differ substantially in the extent to which they would share or
give clients decisionmaking control over strategic decisions that a
22. See BINDER ET AL., supra note 11, at 5-10, 17-18; Miller, supra note 19, at 503-04. But see
William H. Simon, LtanyerAdvice and ClientAutonomy: Mrs. Jones's Case, 50 MD. L. REV. 213,222-26 (1991)
(arguing that good lawyering often demands that lawyers makejudgments about their clients' best interests
and influence their clients to adopt those judgments).
23. The lawyer remains an active participant in the counseling process advocated by Binder,
Bergman and Price, but counsel is cautioned to withhold her advice or opinion regarding the client's best
course of action so as not to unduly influence or override her client's fundamental decisions. BINDER ET
AL., supra note I1, at 19-22. Other client-centered theorists have criticized this aspect of the Binder and
Price approach arguing that denying advice to clients is manipulative and paternalistic, see Ellmann, supra
note 19, at 744-45, or that more flexibility regarding the circumstances when advice should be proffered
is warranted, see Dinerstein, supra note 19, at 509-10, 567-70. In addition, the informed consent model
advocated by some commentators, see, e.g., Spiegel, supra note 16, envisions shared decisionmaking between
lawyer and client, a different goal from that sought by those espousing the Binder and Price approach. See
Dinerstein, supra note 19, at 507, 529-34.
24. Some client-centered theorists contend that lawyers must be given considerable freedom to
perform their craft without client interference stating that:
[A] client's decision to hire you is tacit willingness for you to make lawyering skills decisions
free from consultation. Thus, such matters as how you cross examine, write briefs, or phrase
contingency clauses are generally for you alone to decide, even though they may have a
substantial impact. They involve primarily the exercise ofthe skills and crafts that are the
special domain of lawyers.
BINDER ET AL., supra note 11, at 270. But see supra note 23.
25. AsJustice Brennan observed, "[l rom the standpoint of effective administration ofjustice, the
need to confer decisive authority on the attorney is paramount with regard to the hundreds ofdccisions that
must be made quickly in the course of a trial." Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 760 (1983) (Brennan,J.,
dissenting).
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traditionalist would certainly label as tactical and, therefore, exclusively
the lawyer's1
6
Client-centered theorists have not, for the most part, addressed how
impasses between lawyers and clients over strategic choices should be
resolved.2 7  Undoubtedly, while many espousing a client-centered
approach ultimately may opt to defer to Brown's choice not to call his
father to the witness stand, not all client-centered lawyers would do so.
Binder, Bergman and Price surely would expect a lawyer to consult with
Brown before making a final decision regarding calling the father as a
witness, but they do not indicate that a lawyer should defer to the
client's wishes in such a situation." Rather, Binder, Bergman and Price
suggest that counsel should not permit Brown to make a tactical choice
if, in her professional judgment, Brown's tactic will compromise the
attaining of the client's chosen goals. For many advocates of a client-
centered approach, however, respect for Brown's choice is at the heart
of this approach to lawyering.29
C. Decisionmaking in Practice
Although many legal educators espouse a client-centered approach
to lawyering,3° many criminal practitioners still adhere to the traditional
view. Indeed, a recent study of almost 700 public defenders revealed
that a majority of those defenders believed in, and practiced, a lawyer-
centered approach to decisionmaking.3" Nonetheless, that same study
confirmed that a significant minority of public defenders surveyed
favored a more client-centered approach. Unquestionably, not all
26. Compare BINDER ET AL., supra note 11, at 270-71 (lawyering skills decisions are the special
domain of lawyers but many such decisions warrant client consultation), with Spiegel, supra note 16, at 123-
26 (client decides whether to call witness or cross-examine a particular witness though lawyer decides how
to perform particular task such as the order of proof and the details of eliciting testimony).
27. For an extensive look at the failure of most client-centered literature to provide guidance on the
allocation of specific decisionmaking power, see Miller, supra note 19, at 505-514.
28. See BINDER ET AL., supra note 11, at 271, 281-86.
29. See, e.g., Spiegel, supra note 16, at 123-26.
30. See Linda F. Smith, Inteniaing Clients: A Linguistic Comparison of the "Tradlitional" Interiew and the
"Client-Centered" Inteniew, I CLINICAL L. REV. 541, 543 (1995) (noting that the client-centered theory of
representation is "accepted and adopted throughout the nation's law schools").
31. See RodneyJ. Uphoff &Peter B. Wood, The Allocation qfDecisionmaking Between Defense Counsel and
CriinalDeJndimt: An Empirical Study ]f Attorney-Client Deciionmalisg, 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 32-51 (1998)
(describing a study of 699 public defenders in five offices that looked at the attitudes and practices of the
respondents with respect to twelve strategic decisions commonly faced in criminal cases).
32. See id. at 37-38 (reporting that 38% of the public defenders in the study generally approved of
a more client-centered approach). The study indicated, however, that this commitment to and practice of
a more client-centered approach varied significantly depending on the strategic or tactical decision to be
made. See id. at 38-39.
HeinOnline  -- 68 U. Cin. L. Rev. 770 1999-2000
2000] RESPECTING A DEFENDANT'S TACTICAL CHOICES 771
lawyers can be readily identified as a particular type of decisionmaker
nor can all decisions be easily pigeonholed into those which are solely
for the client and others which are exclusively the concern of counsel 3
Lawyers who prefer a client-centered approach do not consistently
consult with clients with respect to all significant case decisions nor
uniformly provide all clients equal access to decisionmaking power.3 4
Nor do all lawyers with a lawyer-centered approach necessarily dictate
all tactical and strategic decisions to every client or always refuse to
respect the wishes of a client who'is insisting upon a dubious strategic
choice. Nevertheless, lawyers do tend to have a client-centered or
lawyer-centered orientation, an orientation that generally reflects their
view of the appropriate role of counsel in controlling case decisions.3"
If a majority of lawyers, in fact, have a lawyer-centered orientation,
one would expect that most of them would resolve the impasse facing
counsel in the Brown case by calling the father as a witness. In the
survey noted above, 88.6% of the lawyers responding to the study
indicated that it is the lawyer's decision that controls when counsel and
client disagree about the decision whether to call a particular witness.3 6
What is somewhat surprising, however, is that of the twelve trial-related
decisions analyzed in this study, 7 the impasse over a witness generated
the third highest percentage in favor of lawyer control of a disputed
issue. The fact that such an overwhelming percentage of respondents
33. See Hurder, supra note 20, at 77-80 (claiming that dividing decisions into those in the client's
domain and delegating others to the lawyer neither reflects actual practice nor is desirable, but that the
preferred approach involves open negotiation and joint decisionmaking).
34. Dinerstein, supra note 19, at 569-604. For empirical support for both propositions, see Uphoff
& Wood, supra note 31, at 32-59.
35. In Charles Ogletree's view, a public defender's decisionmaking orientation or conception ofher
role turns on the weight that she gives to the value of empathy compared to the value of heroism. See
CharlesJ. Ogletree,Jr., BgondJusifications: Seeking Motivations to Sustain Public Defenders, 106 HARV. L. REV.
1239, 1271-81 (1993). To Ogletree:
[t]he empathetic lawyer quite naturally embraces the client-centered approach to
representation, which "emphasiz[cs] the importance of clients' expertise, thoughts and
feelings in resolving problems." She is likely to bring the client into decisionmaking and to
respect the client's decisions, even on strategic matters that have been traditionally allocated
to the lawyer. By contrast, the "heroic" public defender tends to accord a much less central
role to the client. Narrowly focused on the goal of winning the case, she is likely to limit
client autonomy and input to the minimum required by ethical rules, for fear that the client
will make the "wrong" decisions.
Id. at 1281 (quoting BINDER, ET AL., supra note 11, at 18 (citation omitted)).
36. See Uphoff& Wood, supra note 31, at 39.
37. The twelve decisions were: whether to waive a jury trial; whether to accept a plea bargain;
whether the defendant will testify at trial; whether to waive a preliminary hearing; whether to initiate plea
bargaining; whether to raise an affirmative defense; whether to request a lesser included instruction;
whether to File a suppression motion; whether to call a defense witness; whether to request the
appointment of an expert; whether to interview a prosecution witness; and whether to exercise a
peremptory challenge. See id. at 34.
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agreed that lawyers should have the final say over witnesses is rather
remarkable given the fact that 38% of the respondents agreed, at least
to some extent, with the general proposition that lawyers should allow
their clients to make all important case decisions.
38
It is unclear, of course, if this study of public defenders is
representative of criminal defense lawyers as a whole. In addition,
simply because a lawyer answers a survey in a particular way does not
mean, when faced with a real client and a real dilemma, that lawyer
will, in fact, act in accordance with his or her theoretical answer. More
importantly, knowing how most lawyers claim they would handle a
disputed decision does not-or at least should not-determine for the
conscientious lawyer how to resolve a dispute such as that facing counsel
in the Brown case. 39 Before taking a closer look at the difficulties facing
the criminal defense lawyer struggling with the dilemma posed by the
Brown case, it is important to review the guidance that ethical rules,
caselaw, and professional standards offer the criminal practitioner.
III. THE SELECTION OF DEFENSE WITNESSES: WHO CONTROLS
THE FINAL DECISION?
A. The Ethical Rules and the Allocation of Decisionmakiig Authority
The law student or lawyer seeking to determine whether the lawyer
or client has the final say on any particular strategic or tactical decision
will find only limited guidance in the ethical rules of the legal profession.
Although commentators have looked to language in both the Model
Code of Professional Responsibility4" ("Model Code") and the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct4' ("Model Rules") to justify a client-
centered approach to decisionmaking, these ethical codes provide even
more support for those espousing the traditional model of the lawyer-
client relationship.42 In the end, however, neither the Model Code nor
the Model Rules offer a definitive answer to the question of how
decisionmaking power should be allocated between lawyer and client.
Nor does either ethical code resolve conclusively the specific question of
who ultimately controls the decision to call particular witnesses.
38. See id. at 37-38.
39. For a thoughtful discussion of the point that knowing how lawyers behave does not resolve the
question of how lawyers ought to behave, see Ted Schneyer, Gettingjfom "Is" to "Ought" in Legal Ethics:
Mann's Defending White-Collar Crime, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES.J. 903.
40. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILIT'Y (1980).
41. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1989).
42. See Dinerstein, smpra note 19, at 534-38; Miller, supra note 19, at 506-11.
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1. The Model Code of Professional Responsibility
Model Code Ethical Consideration 7-7 seemingly grants clients broad
decisionmaking power:
In certain areas of legal representation not affecting the merits of the
cause or substantially prejudicing the rights of a client, a lawyer is'
entitled to make decisions on his own. But otherwise the authority to
make decisions is exclusively that of the client and, if made within the
framework of the law, such decisions are binding on his lawyer.43
Although this provision gives the lawyer the right to make some
decisions, it constitutes a significant check on a lawyer's decisionmaking
authority by specifically reserving for the client the authority to make
any decision affecting the merits of the cause or substantially prejudicing
the client's rights. Construed literally, almost any strategic and tactical
decision in a case could affect the merits of the case and, therefore, all
such decisions should be the client's. Yet, the examples set out in EC 7-
7-accepting a settlement offer, waiving an affirmative defense,
pleading guilty or taking an appeal-are the types of significant
decisions generally considered to be reserved for the client, suggesting,
therefore, that this provision is not meant to be read too broadly.'
Similarly, Model Code EC 7-8 lends some support to the position that
the client is the prime decisionmaker in the lawyer-client relationship by
declaring that "[i] n the final analysis, however, the lawyer should always
remember that the decision whether to forego legally available
objectives or methods because of non-legal factors is ultimately for the
client and not for himself."45 Read in its entirety, EC 7-8 describes a
decisionmaking process in which the lawyer has a duty to bring to the
client's attention a full range of information and to offer advice that
includes moral and non-legal considerations so that the client fully
appreciates the ramifications of the decisions the client must make. EC
7-8 gives the client the power, not only to decline to pursue a legally
available objective, but also to forego a particular method.
In the Brown case, the defendant's desire to keep his father off the
witness stand was based on Brown's concern for his father's physical and
emotional well-being. Thus, EC 7-8 arguably affords Brown the
authority to trump his lawyer's chosen method-calling Brown's father
43. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILTY EC 7-7 (1980).
44. Other commentators also doubt that EC 7-7 was meant to be read broadly. See, e.g., Spiegel,
supra note 16, at 65-67; Dinerstein, supra note 19, at 534-35.
45. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-8 (1980).
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as a witness-because the defendant's decision rests on a non-legal
concern. EC 7-8 seemingly dictates that, despitethe lawyer's legitimate
fear that the failure to call this critical defense witness will result in a
guilty verdict, the decision regarding this "non-legal" factor ultimately
rests with the client.
On the other hand, despite using the word "methods," EC 7-8
basically describes a process designed to ensure that the client makes
decisions related to the objectives or ends of the representation, not one
necessarily meant to apply to all of the tactical or strategic decisions
involved in the litigation of a case. The provision surely reminds
lawyers that it is the client's non-legal concerns, not the lawyer's, that
are paramount. Nevertheless, reading EC 7-8 in conjunction with the
rest of the Code, it is doubtful that the provision was ever intended to
grant to the client the final say over strategic matters when the lawyer
and client disagree about a legal factor-the utility of the father's
testimony-that may affect the client's case.
Indeed, the Model Code's very next provision, EC 7-9, undercuts the
argument that EC 7-7 and EC 7-8 grant clients ultimate decisionmaking
authority for all significant strategic and tactical decisions. EC 7-9 states
that: "[i]n the exercise of his professional judgment on those decisions
which are for his determination in the handling of a legal matter, a
lawyer should always act in a manner consistent with the best interests
of his client."4 Although this provision does not spell out in any detail
which decisions are within the lawyer's domain, EC 7-9 unmistakably
indicates that lawyers retain significant decisionmaking authority
beyond mere technical matters.47
The Model Code contains other language evincing the inconsistency
of its guidance on the proper allocation of decisionmaking authority
between lawyer and client. Model Code EC 7-26 states that a lawyer
should "present any admissible evidence his client desires to have
presented unless he knows, or from facts within his knowledge should
know, that such testimony or evidence is false, fraudulent or perjured."48
Read plainly, EC 7-26 directs a lawyer to follow a client's wishes if that
client wants a particular witness to be called. Yet, no court has looked
to this provision as authority for the proposition that a lawyer must defer
to the client's decision to call a witness even though counsel believes that
the witness will hurt the defense case or merely provide cumulative or
irrelevant testimony. Nor is there any reported decision disciplining a
lawyer for failing to honor a client's request that certain evidence be
46. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-9 (1980) (citations omitted).
47. See Spiegel, supra note 16, at 66.
48. MODEL CIODE OF PROFIESSIONAI RISPONSIBlIurrY EC 7-26 (1980) (citations omitted).
774
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presented.49 Indeed, the fact that EC 7-26 does not even speak to the
dilemma posed in the Brown case-the lawyer wants to present
admissible evidence by calling a particular witness, but the client does
not want that witness called-constitutes further evidence thatthis
provision was never intended to apply to or to resolve the question of
whether counsel or the client has the final say in selecting the witnesses
to be called at trial.
Finally, the only disciplinary rules that touch on the subject of the
allocation of decisionmaking further illustrate the Model Code's mixed
guidance. DR 7-101(B)(1) states that a lawyer may "[w]here
permissible, exercise his professional judgment to waive or fail to assert
a right -or position of his client.""0  This vague grant of broad
discretionary power to counsel cannot be squared with an expansive
reading of EC 7-7 and EC 7-8. It is equally difficult to reconcile the
discretion provided counsel by DR 7-101 (B)(1) with DR 7-101 (A)(1)'s
command that a lawyer "shall not intentionally fail to seek the lawful
objectives of his client through reasonably available means permitted by
law."" Simply put, the vague and conflicting provisions of the Model
Code do not provide lawyers a useful framework for determining how
decisionmaking responsibility is to be divided properly between lawyer
and client.
2. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct
Initially, the Model Rules appear to be a significant improvement
over the Model Code. Model Rule 1.2 sets up a distinction between the
objectives and the means of the representation and states that, except in
limited situations, a lawyer "shall abide by a client's decisions
concerning the objectives of representation."52 Unquestionably, the
49. But see Nichols v. Butler, 953 F.2d 1550, 1552-54 (11 th Cir. 1992) (holding that lawyer acted
improperly in threatening to withdraw mid-trial and thereby coercing the defendant into giving up his right
to testify). Additionally, lawyers have been found to have provided ineffective assistance of counsel for
failing to call certain defense witnesses. See, e.g., People v. Bell, 505 N.E.2d 365, 368-71 (Il1. App. 1987);
Wenzy v. State, 855 S.W.2d 47, 50-51 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993). Although no court has looked to the
provisions ofthe Model Code to find that a defense lawyer behaved unprofessionally in overriding a client's
wishes regarding the selection of witnesses, courts have looked to EC 7-7 and 7-8 to find that counsel
behaved properly in acceding to a defendant's strategic wishes. See, e.g., Trimble v. State, 693 S.W.2d 267,
278-79 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
50. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIIIuTY DR 7- 101 (B)(1) (1980).
51. MODEL CODE OF I'ROFESSIONAL RESI'ONSIiIuTY DR 7-10 I 1(A)(1) (1980) (citations omitted).
Other commentators have noted the inconsistent guidance provided by the Model Code. See, e.g.,
Dinerstein, supra note 19, at 535 n. 153; Judith L. Mau te,Allocation of DecisionmakingAuhorit Under theModel
Rules ofProfessiond Conduct, 17 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1049, 1056-57 (1984).
52. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(a) (1989).
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client has the right to determine the goals of the legal matter in which
he or she is embroiled.53 On the other hand, the client does not control
the selection of the means used to attain those goals. Rather, Model
Rule 1.2 provides that, although the lawyer must consult with the client
as to means, it is the lawyer's responsibility to select the means used to
achieve the client's ends. 4
On its face, Model Rule 1.2 offers practitioners an easy-to-apply
standard. The lawyer need only determine if the disputed decision
involves an objective or a means to an objective, and the lawyer then
knows who ultimately controls the decision. The selection of a witness
is a strategic or tactical decision that is only a means to the desired end:
winning the lawsuit. Accordingly, such a decision is squarely within the
lawyer's province.
Nonetheless, as the Comment to Rule 1.2 recognizes, "a clear
distinction between objectives and means sometimes cannot be
drawn." 55 In fact, the lawyer's selection of means or counsel's strategic
choices may so profoundly affect the client's substantive rights and the
opportunity to realize the client's objectives that it is inconsistent with
general agency principles to permit the lawyer/agent such sweeping
control.56 It is questionable whether Rule 1.2 was intended to authorize
53. It is proper, of course, for a lawyer to counsel a client to rethink, to change, or to abandon
certain goals and to raise non-legal concerns, including ethical and moral considerations, in the course of
rendering such counsel. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.1 and cmt. (1989);
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-8 (1980); COCHRANJR., ETAL., supra note 19,
at 165-87; FREEDMAN,sura note 9, at 50-52. If, at the end ofsuch moral counseling, the lawyer and client
still disagree about the objectives of the case, then counsel may seek to withdraw from that representation
ifthe client is choosing to pursue goals counsel deems repugnant or immoral. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM,
MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 158 (1986). Ifcounsel continues to represent the client, however, she must defer
to her client's chosen goals. SHAFFER & COCHRANJR., supra note 11, at 40-54.
54. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2 cmt. (1989).
55. Id. See (dso RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 3 1, cmt. (Proposed
Final Draft No. 1 1996) (noting that it may be unclear whether a decision relating to the representation is
to be made by the client or the lawyer).
56. See RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OFAGENCY § 14 (1958) (principal has right to control the conduct
ofan agent with respect to matters entrusted to him); § 369 (an agent cannot act contrary to a principal's
wishes); and § 385 (agent subject to duty to obey all reasonable directions to the manner of performing a
service agent has agreed to perform). Although an attorney is in complete charge ofthe "minutiae ofcourt
proceedings" and may be permitted to withdraw if not allowed to act as counsel thinks best, the attorney,
nonetheless, is duty bound not to act contrary to the directions of the principal. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OFAGENCY § 385, cmt. As that same comment makes clear, however, the agent is under no duty
to perform illegal or unethical acts. See id. Similarly, the two latest draft versions of §§ 31-34 of the
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS generally reflect these same agency
principles. That is, the proposed RESTATEMENT mandates considerable attorney-client consultation
regarding decisions and allows for variations in the allocation ofdecisionmaking depending on the client's
wishes and the parties' agreement, but sharply limit a lawyer's power to ignore a client's instructions even
over strategic matters. See RES TATEMENT (THIRD) OFTHE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 31-34 and cmts.
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1 1996) and (Proposed Final Draft 1998).
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lawyers to act contrary to the express wishes of their clients on important
strategic decisions. Many legal scholars, therefore, have sharply
criticized the ends/means test as vague and unhelpful in determining
whether the lawyer or a client ultimately has the right to make,.a
particular strategic decisionY
Other language in the Comments to Model Rules 1.2 and 1.3 only
compounds the confusion. The Comment to Model Rule 1.2 retreats
from the dichotomy presented in the Rule itself by declaring first that
"[b]oth lawyer and client have authority and responsibility in the
objectives and means of representation," then suggesting that often "the
client-lawyer relationship partakes of a joint undertaking," and finally
warning that the law defining the scope of a lawyer's authority in
litigation "varies among jurisdictions."58 That same Comment also
includes the disclaimer that "a lawyer is not required to pursue
objectives or employ means simply because a client may wish to do
so."" 9 No explanation is offered as to when or under what circumstances
a lawyer is justified in ignoring or overriding a client's objectives. Nor
can this language be easily squared with the command of Rule 1.2 itself.
Similarly, it is not easy to reconcile Rule 1.2's directive about abiding by
the client's decision regarding objectives with the Comment to Model
Rule 1.3 which proclaims that "a lawyer is not bound to press for every
advantage that might be realized for a client."6
The Comments to the Model Rules not only undercut the client's
authority regarding objectives, but they also opine that the lawyer's
control of the means used in a client's case is not unlimited. Although
the Comment to Model Rule 1.3 notes that a lawyer "has professional
discretion in determining the means by which a matter should be
pursued,"'" the Comment to Rule 1.2 goes on to speak of shared
responsibility over means.62 Moreover, in the Comment to Model Rule
57. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 19, at 506-09; Dinerstein, supra note 19, at 535-538; Strauss, supra
note 19, at 317-26; BINDERETAL., supra note 11, at 267-271; Maute, supra note 51, at 1080-1105; Luban,
supra note 16, at 459; Lee A. Pizzimenti, The Lawyer'sDup To Warn CientAbout Limits On Confielntialiy, 39
CATH. U. L. REV. 441,473-476 (1990).
. 58. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2 cmt. (1989). The Comments to a Rule
are intended only to illuminate the meaning of a rule, not to change the meaning. There are, however,
many instances where the Comments call for lawyers to act in a manner at odds with the demands of the
Rule itself. See FREEDMAN, supra note 9, at 99-107.
59. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCTRule 1.2 cmt. (1989).
60. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.3 cmt. (1989).
61. Id. As the Comment to the draft version of§ 34 of the RESTATEMENT(THIRD) OFTHE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS recognizes, lawyers have the inherent authority to make many decisions that are
required in the course of litigation when time does not permit consultation. If a client gives contrary
instructions, however, counsel is bound to follow the client's instructions. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, § 34, cmt. (Proposed Final Draft No. I 1996).
62. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2, cmt. (1989).
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1.2, the lawyer is cautioned that "[i]n questions of means, the lawyer
should assume responsibility for technical and legal tactical issues, but
should defer to the client regarding such questions as the expense to be
incurred and concern for third persons who might be adversely
affected. 63 Such language hardly suggests that lawyer's professional
discretion regarding means is unrestricted. Rather, for defense counsel
in the Brown case wrestling with the decision whether to call the client's
elderly father against the client's wishes,- the Comment to Rule 1.2
arguably directs counsel to defer to her client's choice because that
choice reflects Brown's concern for his father's health. A broad reading
of this Comment arguably strips counsel of considerable control over
case tactics, a result seemingly inconsistent with the language of Rule 1.2
itself. In the end, however, the vagueness of the objectives/means test
and the inconsistencies in the Model Rules and their Comments neither
mandate a particular structure to the attorney-client relationship nor
dictate a particular resolution to counsel's dilemma in the Brown case.
B. Federal Courts and Decisionmaking Responsibility Between Counsel and
Criminal Defendant
1. The Supreme Court and Allocation of Decisionmaking
Responsibilities
Although the profession's ethical rules do not demand that lawyers
adhere to a particular lawyering orientation, a criminal defense
practitioner struggling with the issue raised by the Brown case also must
look to constitutional mandates, especially caselaw interpreting the Sixth
Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel, to determine if
the United States Constitution commands any particular allocation of
decisionmaking power between counsel and the criminal defendant."
Such a search reveals that the Constitution actually dictates very little
about the allocation of decisionmaking authority between lawyer and
criminal defendant. 5 The Constitution does not preclude a lawyer from
sharing decisionmaking power with a client. On the other hand, except
for a few specified decisions ultimately reserved for the defendant,66 the
Constitution does not require that a defendant represented by counsel
63. Id.
64. In a state criminal case, a criminal defense lawyer also must ensure that the state constitution
of thatjurisdiction has not been interpreted to grant decisionmaking authority to a criminal defendant over
a specific issue.
65. SeeJones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 755 (1983) (Blackmun,J., concurring).
66. Seesuira note 13.
778
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be given any control over the strategic decisions made on his or her
behalf.67
A criminal defendant is not bound to accept legal representation.
That is, the mere fact that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
Constitution guarantee the assistance of counsel does not mean that a
state may constitutionally force a lawyer upon a criminal defendant.6"
Rather, as the Court recognized in Faretta v. Califomia6 9 the Sixth
Amendment grants to every accused the right to self-representation-to
conduct one's own defense personally-because it is the defendant who
suffers the consequences if that defense is unsuccessful. Even though a
criminal defendant is likely to be better served by proceeding with
counsel's guidance, a defendant is free to decline to take advantage of
counsel's training and expertise and to "conduct his own defense
ultimately to his own detriment."7
In trumpeting the importance of the accused's autonomy, the Faretta
decision offers encouragement to those advocating a client-centered
approach to decisionmaking issues.7 Writing for the majority, Justice
Stewart observed that the "language and spirit of the Sixth Amendment
contemplate that counsel.., shall be an aid to a willing defendant" and
that "an assistant, however expert, is still an assistant."72 Nevertheless,
Stewart concluded "law and tradition may allocate to the counsel the
power to make binding decisions of trial strategy in many areas. This
allocation can only be justified, however, by the defendant's consent, at
the outset, to accept counsel as his representative."73 Thus, as long as
the defendant agreed to accept defense counsel, then Stewart was willing
to allow the lawyer/assistant to bind the client/master, at least "in many
areas" of trial strategy.74 Although Faretta did not define with any
67. "Criminal defendants daily entrust their liberty to the skill of their lawyers. The consequences
of the lawyer's decisions fall squarely upon the defendant. There is nothing untoward in this circumstance.
To the contrary, the lawyeras the defendant's representative is at the core ofour adversary process." Jones
v. Estelle, 722 F.2d 159, 165 (5th Cir. 1983).
68. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 834.
71. See Richard H. Chused, Faretta and die Personal Defense: The Rol of a Represented Defendant in Trial
Tactics, 65 CAL. L. REv. 636 (1977) (reading Faretta as requiring lawyers to give defendants greater control
over tactical decisionmaking).
72. Fareta, 422 U.S. at 820.
73. Id. at 820-21 (citations omitted).
74. Id. at 820. Consent to accept appointed counsel at the beginning of a relationship when the
client's only other choice is self-representation is more like a contract of adhesion. The defendant's consent
can hardly be characterized as free and voluntary. Moreover, it is highly unlikely that the defendant's
choice is an informed one. Few defendants are advised that by accepting counsel they are delegating
control over virtually all strategic decisions to counsel. For a discussion of the difficulties of forcing clients
to make a decision about the allocation ofdecisionmaking responsibilities at the onset of the attorney-client
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precision how decisionmaking power in the lawyer-client relationship
was to be divided, the opinion lenids support both to proponents of the
traditional view of lawyering as well as those favoring a more client-
centered approach.75
Subsequent Supreme Court cases demonstrate, however, that the
Constitution provides criminal defense lawyers wide discretion over
decisionmaking issues and requires only that a represented defendant
have final decisionmaking power over a limited number of fundamental
decisions. In his majority opinion in Jones v. Barnes,76 Chief Justice
Burger noted that the accused has the ultimate decisionmaking authority
only over certain matters: whether to plead guilty, waive a jury, testify
on one's behalf, or take an appeal." Thus, defense counsel who usurps
one of these decisions risks offending the Constitution. In all other
aspects of the defense, however, counsel's role is to manage the case and
to make all tactical decisions. As case manager, defense counsel who is
preparing an appellate brief is not constitutionally required to press
every non-frivolous argument desired by the defendant.7" Rather,
counsel has the ability--and ultimately the power-to ignore the client's
express wishes and to present the client's appellate case as counsel sees
fit.
79
In his dissent in Jones, Justice Brennan took issue with Burger's view
of the proper function or role of defense counsel."0 According to
Brennan, defense counsel should be assisting the defendant to make
relationship, see Spiegel, supra note 16, at 77-85. Indigent defendants rarely have any say about the choice
ofcounsel or her lawyering style. Even the paying defendant, unless unusually sophisticated, generally lacks
the knowledge or time to bargain for decisionmaking power at the beginning ofthe relationship. See Bergcr,
supra note 11, at 49-50.
75. Courts generally read Fareta narrowly finding that "a criminal defendant, having agreed to be
represented by counsel, is bound by counsel's decisions on matters entrusted to counsel[.]" State v. Lee,
689 P.2d 153, 159 (Ariz. 1984) (in banc). But see Chused, sulfra note 71, 649-56 (arguing that Faretta
mandates greater control by defendants ofstrategic and tactical decisons).
76. 463 U.S. 745 (1983).
77. Id. at 751.
78. Appointed appellate counsel must act as an active advocate - not that of amicus curiae - and
"support his client's appeal to the best of his ability," even though couisel's professional judgment is that
her client's appeal has no merit. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967).
79. As authority for his position, Burger looked to the final draft of Model Rule 1.2(a) which
specified that "the lawyer shall abide by the client's decision ... as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive
jury trial and whether the client will testify." Jones, 463 U.S. at 753 n.6. Burger then declared that "[w]ith
the exception of these specified fundamental decisions, an attorney's duty is to take professional
responsibility for the conduct of the case, after consulting with his client." Id.
80. Jones, 463 U.S. at 758-64 (Brennan,J., dissenting). Brennan's dissent wasjoined by Justice
Marshall. In his concurring opinionJustice Blackmun also expressed his agreement with Brennan's ethical
view observing that "it seems to me that the lawyer, after giving his client his best opinion as to the course
most likely to succeed, should acquiesce in the client's choice ofwhich non-frivolous claims to pursue." Id.
at 754 (Blackmun,J., concurring).
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choices, not imposing choices on the defendant because "[t] he role of
the defense lawyer should be above all to function as the instrument and
defender of the client's autonomy and dignity in all phases of the
criminal process."'" Clients aided by competent counsel have the
capacity to make informed tactical judgments about their appeals. Even
if counsel may be better able to make wiser tactical choices,
Brennan-citing Faretta-argued that the Sixth Amendment obligates
defense counsel to conduct the defense requested by the defendant.82 In
Brennan's view, then, the Constitution gives the criminal defendant a
personal right to make the decision which non-frivolous issues should be
presented on appeal, even against the advice of counsel, if the defendant
so chooses.83
Brennan's view of lawyering as articulated in Jones is decidedly more
client-centered than that endorsed by the majority. Brennan flatly
rejected the proposition that by choosing a lawyer a criminal defendant
relinquishes control over every aspect of the case except for the most
basic structural issues. Rather, "[a] defendant's interest in his case
clearly extends to other matters."8" For Brennan, then, the accused's
right to make strategic choices-even if detrimental-is not limited just
to fundamental decisions basic to the defense. 5 The defendant's
decisionmaking power, however, is not unbounded. Brennan
acknowledged that the allocation of authority between lawyer and client
at trial is subject to significant time constraints. He recognized,
therefore, the need to confer decisionmaking authority on the lawyer
with regard to "the hundreds of decisions that must be made quickly in
the course of a trial. 86
Brennan's views on the role of defense counsel and the proper
allocation ofdecisionmaking responsibility between lawyer and criminal
defendant did not command a majority in Jones or in any subsequent
81. Id. at 763.
82. In addition to Faretta, Brennan cited Anders v. Calitfonia, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) in support of his
proposition. jones, 463 U.S. at 759 (Brennan,J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 758.
84. Id. at 759.
85. Absent exceptional circumstances, he is bound by the tactics used by his counsel at trial
and on appeal. Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 433,451, 85 S. Ct 564, 569, 13 L.Ed.2d
408(1963). He may want to press the argument that he is innocent, even ifother stratagems
are more likely to result in the dismissal ofcharges or in a reduction ofpunishment. He may
want to insist on certain arguments for political reasons. He may want to protect third
parties. This isjust as true on appeal as at trial, and the proper role of counsel is to assist
him in these efforts, insofar as that is possible consistent with the lawyer's conscience, the
law, and his duties to the court.
86. Id. at 760.
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decision. Indeed, in the following term, in the landmark case of
Strickland v. Washington,87 the Court fashioned a test for evaluating claims
of ineffective assistance of counsel that emphasizes the importance of
respecting counsel's professional judgments. A reviewing court must
presume that defense counsel rendered adequate assistance and that
counsel "made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable
professional judgment.""8 Such a presumption means that counsel's
strategic choices regarding plausible options made after thorough
investigation of law and facts are "virtually unchallengeable." 9 By
creating this highly deferential standard, the Court in Stricklandimplicidy
reinforced the validity of the traditional, lawyer-centered approach to
decisionmaking. Admittedly, Strickland refers to defense counsel "as
assistant to the defendant," who has certain basic duties including "the
overarching duty to advocate the defendant's cause and the more
particular duties to consult with the defendant on important decisions
and to keep the defendant informed of important developments."90 In
delineating counsel's duties, however, the Court undoubtedly is
describing a lawyer-client relationship in which the lawyer/assistant is,
in fact, in control of the litigation. In fact, the Court specifically
declined to adopt a set of standards or to provide rules of conduct
outlining defense counsel's duties and responsibilities when representing
a criminal defendant. Such rules or standards, the Court worried,
would interfere with counsel's professional independence and with "the
wide latitude counsel must have in making tactical decisions.""
Given the Strickland Court's willingness to defer to counsel's tactical
decisions, the Court's observation, later in the opinion, that "[c] ounsel's
actions are usually based, quite properly, on informed strategic choices
made by the defendant," is somewhat surprising.92 Perhaps this is
primarily an empirical observation that often defense counsel acts
consistent with the expressed wishes of the defendant. The Court's use
of the phrase "quite properly," however, implies not only that wise
counsel seeks to secure the informed consent of the defendant before
acting, but also that the Court approves of such a lawyering approach.
Yet, in view of the Court's earlier statement limiting counsel's duty to
consult with and to inform clients about important decisions, together
with the Court's overriding concern not to infringe upon counsel's
87. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
88. Id. at 690.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 688.
91. Id. at 689.
92. Id. at 691.
782
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professional independence,93 it is difficult to conceive that the Court was
expressing its preference for such an approach.
Indeed, subsequent cases clearly reveal the Supreme Court's support
for the traditional view of lawyering. In Taylor v. Illinois,94 the Court
upheld the authority of a state trial judge to preclude two defense
witnesses -from testifying as a sanction for a discovery violation.
Although the Court acknowledged that "[flew rights are more
fundamental than that of an accused to present witnesses in his own
defense,"95 it found that the defendant's right to present defense
evidence may be outweighed by "countervailing public interests"-the
integrity of the adversary process and the potential prejudice to the
truth-determining function of the trial. 96 Because defense counsel~s
conduct was willful and designed to obtain a tactical advantage, those
countervailing interests justified the preclusion sanction in Taylor even
though the defendant was not personally responsible for the discovery
violation.
The Taylor majority specifically rejected the argument that the client
should not be blamed for the sins of defense counsel declaring that such
an argument "strikes at the heart of the attorney-client relationship."97
Insisting that "[t] he adversary process could not function effectively if
every tactical decision required client approval," the Court once again
expressed its preference for the traditional view of lawyer-client
relationship.98 "[T]he lawyer has-and must have-full authority to
manage the conduct of the trial."99 This management authority not
only allows defense counsel to decide ultimately whether to call a
witness, but also means that "the client must accept the consequences
of the lawyer's decision. ' ' 0°
Unquestionably, both due process and the Compulsory Process
Clause of the Sixth Amendment grant defendants the right to present
witnesses in their own behalf.'' Indeed, the right to call witnesses has
long been recognized as essential to the defendant's right to a fair
trial.' O2 Thus, any action by the State or a trial court to restrict the
93. See id. at 688.
94. 484 U.S. 400 (1988).
95. Id. at 408 (citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973)).




100. Id. The client is bound by defense counsel's strategic maneuvers unless, of course, counsel's
representation fell below the minimum standard guaanteed by the Sixth Amendment.
101. See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 56 (1987); Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 51 (1987);
Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683,690-91 (1986); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 298-302 (1973).
102. See Chambers, 410 U.S. at 294.
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defendant's right to proffer competent, reliable evidence to the jury
warrants close scrutiny."'0 In Taylor, however, the defendant's
fundamental right to present an adequate defense was compromised
because of the misconduct of his own representative. Moreover, the
defendant's right to offer evidence was trumped even though there was
no evidence that he bore any responsibility for the discovery violation.0 4
Arbitrary rules of evidence that prevent a defendant from calling
witnesses or presenting evidence will not pass constitutional muster, but
arbitrary decisions of counsel-or even counsel's inaction or
misconduct-can bar defense witnesses from being heard." 5
2. Lower Federal Courts and Allocation of Decisionmaking
Responsibility
Like the Supreme Court, lower federal courts have struggled to
outline counsel's role in assisting criminal defendants to exercise their
related rights to testify, to call witnesses, and to present a defense. A
brief look at that struggle highlights the inconsistent guidance afforded
criminal defense lawyers wrestling with defendants over strategic issues
involving the presentation of the defense case. It also reveals sharply
divergent judicial views of what constitutes the proper role of defense
counsel in making significant strategic decisions.
Wright v. Estelle..6 represents a striking example of the contrasting
judicial attitudes regarding the allocation of decisionmaking authority
between counsel and defendant. In Wright, a majority of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, declined
to decide that the defendant had a personal constitutional right to testify.
Instead, the majority merely accepted the holding of the panel below
which found that even assuming such a constitutional right, any denial
of that right was harmless in view of the overwhelming evidence against
the defendant.0 7 In a concurring opinion, five members of the court
chastised the majority for failing to reach the issue and to provide
guidance to litigants, lawyers, and trial judges as to whom has the final
103. See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. at 55-56 (quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. at 295).
104. See Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 433 (1988) (Brennan,J., dissenting).
105. See, e.g., United States v. Russell, 109 F.3d 1503, 1507-13 (10th Cir. 1997) (excluding evidence
for discovery violation despite absence of counsel's bad faith in failing to list two potential defense
witnesses); People of the Territory of Guam v. Palomo, 35 F.3d 368, 374-75 (9th Cir. 1994) (upholding
the exclusion ofa defense witness for discovery violations absent any evidence ofwillful or- blatant violations
by the defense).
106. 572 F.2d 1071 (5th Cir. 1978) (en bane) (on rehearing a majority of the court adheres to the
panel opinion reported at 549 F.2d 971 (5th Cir. 1978)).
107. Seeid. at l071.
784
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say when client and counsel disagree regarding the client taking the
witness stand. "' For these judges, the issue ultimately turned on who
was in better position to judge trial strategy and ensure the best interests
of the defendant. In their view, defense lawyers, as "professional
artisans," were not only obligated to see that their clients received the
best defense, but also better positioned to dictate trial strategy.0 9 Thus,
counsel should be authorized to make the strategic decision whether the
defendant should testify and ought not have to yield to the personal
demands of the client.' 10
Judge Godbold, in an eloquent dissent joined by two others,
presented a powerful defense of the client-centered position."' Looking
to the rationale supporting the Faretta decision and to history, Godbold
argued that a criminal defendant has a personal right to decide
"whether to become an active participant in the proceeding that affects
his life and liberty and to inject his own action, voice and personality
into the process to the extent the system permits." ' 2 ForJudge Godbold
and his fellow dissenters, the defendant has a right to tell his story.
"Indeed, in some circumstances, the defendant, without regard to the
risks, may wish to speak from the stand, over the head ofjudge and jury,
to a larger audience. It is not for his attorney to muzzle him." ' 3 In the
end, respect for the dignity of the individual and for freedom of choice
demand that defendants be given, not just their day in court, but their
time on the witness stand if they so desire.
Most federal courts have agreed withJudge Godbold's view that the
defendant's right to testify is a fundamental constitutional right."4 In
reaffirming that a defendant has a constitutional right to testify, a
majority of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
in United States v. Teague' '5 emphasized that the right is personal to the
defendant and cannot be waived by the court or by counsel."' Thus, a
defendant must be allowed to testify even though counsel deems the
108. See id. at 1072 (Thornberry, Clark, Roney, Gee and Hill,JJ., specially concurring).
109. Seeid. at 1073.
110. See id. at 1073-74.
111. See id. at 1074 (Godbold,J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 1078.
113. Id.
114. See, e.g., Brown v. Artuz, 124 F.3d 73, 76-77 (2nd Cir. 1997); United States v. Ortiz, 82 F.3d
1066, 1070 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Jordan v. Hargett, 34 F.3d 310, 312 (5th Cir. 1994) (vacated without
consideration ofthis point, 53 F.3d 94 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc); United States v. Pennycooke, 65 F.3d 9,
10-11 (3d Cir. 1995); United States v.Joelson, 7 F.3d 174, 177 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. McMeans,
927 F.2d 162, 164 (4th Cir. 1991); Rogers-Bey v. lsne, 896 F.2d 279, 283 (7th Cir. 1990); United States
v. Bernloehr, 833 F.2d 749, 751 (8th Cir. 1987).
115. 953 F.2d 1525 (11 th Cir. 1992) (en banc).
116. See id. at 1532.
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decision strategically unwise. Admittedly, defense counsel may be in a
better position to assess trial strategy and to ensure that sound tactics are
employed.' 7 Nonetheless, "[iut is important to remember that while
defense counsel serves as an advocate for the client, it is the client who
is the master of his or her own defense.""' 8 Defense counsel is duty
bound to advise the defendant as to the advantages and disadvantages
of taking the stand." 9 It is the defendant, however, who ultimately must
be permitted to make the call. Because it is the defendant's day in court,
the defendant has the choice to tell his side of the story and "[t]he'
wisdom or unwisdom of the defendant's choice does not diminish his
right to make it.' '
20
Not all the members of the Eleventh Circuit were persuaded of the
wisdom of the majority's approach in Teague. Judge Edmondson, joined
by two others, acknowledged that the defendant has the right to decide
whether to fight and to be represented by counsel in that fight. 12 1 Once
the defendant makes those decisions, however, defense counsel "need
not defer to the client's desires on how the fight is to be waged."''2 2 For
Edmondson, decisions on calling witnesses, including the defendant, are
"quintessentially tactical and require a trained advocate'sjudgment." 121
To permit the defendant to nullify counsel's tactical efforts and to
override counsel's tactical decision undercuts the adversarial process and
the defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel.124
Although Edmondson's arguments have not carried the day with
respect to final control over the decision as to whether the defendant will
testify, his lawyer-centered position has prevailed on the issue of control
over the decision to call other witnesses. The defendant clearly has a
constitutional right to call witnesses, a right that has been deemed to be
fundamental. 2 ' Nevertheless, despite the importance of the right to call
witnesses on one's own behalf, the defendant's right is not recognized as
117. See id. at 1531 (citing Wright v. Estelle, 549 F.2d 971, 1073 (Thornberry, Clark, Roney, Gee and
HilI,jj., specially concurring)).
118. Id. at 1533.
119. See, e.g., Brown, 124 F.3d at 78 (2nd Cir. 1997); United States v. Teague, 953 F.2d 1525, 1533
(I th Cir. 1992) (en banc); STANDARDS FOR CRINMINALJUSTICE Standard 4-5.2(a).
120. Tegue, 953 F.2d at 1533 (citing Wright v. Estelle, 572 F.2d 1071, 1079 (Godbold,J., dissenting)).




125. "Few rights are more fundamental than that of an accused to present witnesses in his own
defense." Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973). "Indeed, this right is an essential attribute
of the adversary system itself." Tayldr v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 408 (1988). For a detailed look at the
origins and scope of the defendant's right to present witnesses, see Richard A. Nagareda, Reconceiving thRight
to Preseni Witnesses, 97 MICH. L. RIV. 1063 (1999).
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personal to the defendant. Accordingly, federal courts generally have
held that defense counsel is empowered to decide whether, and to what
extent, the defendant's right to compulsory process will be asserted. I
26
Because the defendant's right to call witnesses is not considered a
personal right, defense counsel can waive that right by declining to call
to the stand individuals that the defendant wants to testify. In rare
instances, courts have concluded that a lawyer's fiilure to investigate a
potential defense witness combined with a specific showing of the
importance of that witness' testimony rendered counsel's strategic choice
unreasonable and counsel's performance deficient. 127  Generally,
however, courts have applied the deferential Strickland standard and
refused to second-guess defense counsel's tactical choices regarding
calling witnesses.
28
Reluctant to closely scrutinize defense counsel's professional
judgment in selecting defense witnesses, most federal courts have given
short shrift to the principal that "it is the [defendant] who is the master
of his or her own defense."129 In providing counsel virtually unchecked
power over tactical decisions, courts have significantly undercut the
value of the defendant's right to compulsory process and the defendant's
right to testify. Forjust as "[a] defendant's opportunity to conduct his
own defense by calling witnesses is incomplete if he may not present
himself as a witness,"l"' a defendant's right to testify also is incomplete
if corroborating witnesses are not called to testify in support of the
defendant. Defense counsel's tactical choices regarding witnesses, albeit
ostensibly taken on the defendant's behalf, may render defendant's own
testimony meaningless or incredible, thereby undermining the
defendant's right to present a defense.
For some federal judges, however, the represented defendant's right
to present a defense is actually nothing more than the right to have
defense counsel present a reasonable defense. Judges subscribing to this
*view believe that:
[a] criminal defendant represented by counsel generally has limited
responsibilities in conducting his defense, primarily, recognizing and
126. See Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 418 (1988); Chappce v. Vose, 843 F.2d 25, 27-33 (1st Cir.
1988); United States v. Nersesian, 824 F.2d 1294, 1321 (2d Cir. 1987); Eaton v. United States, 437 F.2d
362, 363 (9th Cir. 1971).
127. See, e.g., Sanders v. Ratelle, 21 F.3d 1446, 1457-58 (9th Cir. 1994); Chambers v. Armontrout,
907 F.2d 825 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 11I S. Ct. 369 (1990); Code v. Montgomery, 799 F.2d 1481,
1483 (11 th Cir. 1986); Gomez v. Beto, 462 F.2d 596, 596-97 (5th Cir. 1972).
128. See, e.g., Austin v. Bell, 126 F.3d 843, 847-48 (6th Cir. 1997); Blanco v. Singletary, 943 F.2d
1477, 1495 (11th Cir. 1991).
129. U.S. v. Teague, 953 F.2d 1525, 1533 (11 th Cir. 1992).
130. Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 52 (1987).
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relating relevant information to counsel and making the few trial-
related decisions reserved for defendants.... The defendant need not
participate in the bulk of trial decisions which he may leave entirely
to counsel (how to select jurors, which witnesses to call, whether and
how to conduct cross-examination, what motions to make, and similar
tactical decisions).131
Thus, in Watts v. Singletay, the court affirmed the defendant's murder
conviction and rejected the challenge to the defendant's competency
despite the fact that the defendant slept through approximately 70% of
his trial.'32 Responding to the dissent's assertion that Watts was unable
to contribute to the defense at all during most of the trial, Judge
Kravitch noted that "[t] his, however, does not differentiate Watts from
most other criminal defendants, who likewise contribute nothing to their
own defenses through the vast majority of proceedings." '133
Judge Kravitch offered no empirical evidence in support of his
contention. Indeed, there is considerable evidence that many
defendants actively participate in their own defenses.'34 The ABA
Standards also envision a lawyer-client relationship that involves
consultation and even joint decisionmaking regarding many trial
decisions.'35 Recall also that the Supreme Court in Strickland observed
that "[c] ounsel's actions are usually based, quite properly, on informed
strategic choices made by the defendant."' 36 Finally, in Cooper v.
Oklahoma,' 37 the Court declared that "[w]ith the assistance of counsel,
the defendant also is called upon to make myriad smaller decisions
concerning the course of his defense."'13' As the Court has long
recognized, a defendant's competence is important because the
defendant's right to a fair trial assumes some active participation of the
defendant in exercising the rights essential to due process-the right to
summon, to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and to testify on
131. Watts v. Singletary, 87 F.3d 1282, 1288-89 (11 th Cir. 1996).
132. See id. at 1290 (Carnes,J., dissenting) (noting that the defendant, a 23-year-old crack addict, slept
though 70% of his trial because of his nightly use of crack).
133. Id. at 1289 n.12.
134. See Uphoff& Wood, supra note 31, at 38-51 (presenting survey results that reflect participation
of many defendants in trial-related decisions); Paul M. Rashkind, "Wake Up! rour Trials Over.' The Bedtime
Tale of Watts v. Singletary, CRIM. JUST., Spring 1999, at 22-23 (arguing that to experienced criminal
defense lawyers, the majority's view in Watts was "uninformed and misapprehends the attorney-client
relationship").
135. See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINALJUSTICE Standard 4-3.1 (e) commentary at 148-49 (3d ed. 1993)
("both lawyer and client have authority and responsibility in determining the objectives and means of
representation ... in many cases the client-lawyer relationship partakes ofajoint undertaking").
136. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691 (1984).
137. 517 U.S. 348 (1996).
138. Id. at 364.
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one's own behalf.3 9 If it is critical that a defendant be competent in
order to participate meaningfully in his or her own defense and not
simply have defense counsel make decisions for the defendant, then why
should a competent defendant be deprived of the right to make an
important tactical decision merely because counsel disagrees with the
wisdom of the defendant's choice?
For the criminal practitioner struggling to decide whether to call a
defense witness over the defendant's objection, neither Strickland nor any
other Supreme Court opinion dictates any particular course of action.
Rather, Strickland grants defense lawyers almost unlimited freedom of
action in managing a case and assures them that their actions will be
deemed professionally adequate as long as such acts can reasonably be
considered to be consistent with sound trial strategy. Although Strickland
does not mandate a lawyer-centered approach to decisionmaking, it
certainly facilitates such an approach.
In the final analysis, neither the Constitution nor the Supreme Court
offers a definitive answer to the question posed by the Brown case or
significant guidance in resolving the troublesome allocation of
decisionmaking questions that lawyers, clients, and courts regularly
confront. 4 ' Decisions of the Supreme Court certainly do not preclude
a lawyer from sharing decisionmaking power with a client-or deferring
to a client's informed tactical choice-'and, at times, even encourage
such a relationship. 4 ' Although federal caselaw generally reflects a
lawyer-centered approach to strategic decisionmaking,'42 there also is
considerable support for the principle that the defendant, as master of
the defense, ought to be afforded broad power to dictate the manner of
the defense.'43 Accordingly, courts rarely will fault defense counsel for
carrying out the strategic wishes of her client."'
139. See id. at 354.
140. See LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 7, at 559-62.
141. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691 (1984).
142. See, e.g., Boyd v. U.S., 586 A.2d 670,673 (D.C. Cir. 1991) ("It is, ofcourse, beyond dispute that
counsel for the accused has ultimate responsibility for many tactical trial decisions, such as which witnesses
to call.").
143. See, e.g., U.S. v. Teague, 953 F.2d 1525, 1533 (11 th Cir. 1992); Mulligan v. Kemp, 771 F.2d
1436, 1441 (11 th Cir. 1985).
144. See, .g., Mulligan v. Kemp, 771 F.2d 1436,1441 (11 th Cir. 1985). But seeAlvord V. Wainwright,
469 U.S. 956 (1984) (Marshall,J., dissenting) (arguing that blind deference to a client's wishes, without any
investigation or regard for the client's mental state, was inappropriate and constitutionally ineffective).
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C. State Courts and the Allocation of Decisionmaking Authority
As we have seen, neither the Constitution nor the ethics codes require
criminal defense lawyers to resolve the dilemma presented by the Brown
case in a particular manner. Nonetheless, a criminal practitioner's
freedom to respond to an impasse over witnesses will be constrained if
there is controlling authority within counsel's jurisdiction on the issue.
Indeed, in a number ofjurisdictions, courts have addressed the specific
question of who controls the decision regarding witnesses when counsel
and client disagree.'45 In some states, courts have provided inconsistent
guidance to defense counsel struggling to resolve a disagreement with a
defendant regarding the decision to call a particular witness. 46 In most
states, however, courts have granted defense counsel broad control over
tactical and strategic matters, thus affording counsel the discretion to
resolve the strategic impasse largely as he or she sees fit.'47
Generally state courts have been asked to address issues involving the
allocation ofdecisionmaking responsibility between lawyer and client in
the same manner as the Supreme Court in Jones v. Barnes. That is, in the
course of reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the court
145. Compare State v. Lee, 689 P.2d 153, 157-60 (Ariz. 1984) (in banc) (holding that strategic decision
regarding selection of witnesses belongs to counsel); State v. Davis, 506 A.2d 86, 92 (Conn. 1986) (finding
that counsel's refusal to accede to client's demand that particular witness be called does not violate
defendant's right to compulsory process); State v. Pratts, 366 A.2d 1327, 1333 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1975) (stating that lawyer has ultimate authority to select witnesses to be called); People v. Williams, 471
P.2d 1008, 1015-16 (Cal. 1970) (holding that counsel controls the tactical decision about witnesses to call);
with Burton v. State, 651 So.2d 641,656 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994) (holding that ultimate decision on calling
witnesses is for the defendant); People v. Wilkinson, 474 S.E.2d 375, 381-82 (N.C. 1996) (reiterating that
if counsel and defendant arc at an absolute impasse regarding witness to call, the client's wishes must
control).
146. In Missouri, for example, the decision whether to call a witness is a matter of trial strategy that
generally will not support a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel. Johnson v. State, 901 S.W.2d 60,
63 (Mo. 1995). Yet, it is clearly appropriate for a criminal defense lawyer in Missouri -to accede to a
defendant's demands that witnesses not be called, even though counsel feels that the client's wishes are
unwise. See State v. Thomas, 625 S.W.2d 115, 123-24 (Mo. 1981). Indeed, in reviewing defense counsel's
duty when faced with a client who insisted that witnesses presenting mitigating evidence not be called, the
Missouri CourtofAppeals frankly acknowledged "the continuing difficulty in determiningdefense counsel's
role in the criminal trial." Trimble v. State, 693 S.W.2d 267, 279 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985). As the Court went
on to admit:
the cases find no error when counsel accedes to client demand, even though the accession
may not be a wise choice. On the other hand; the lawyer's choice made contrary to the
client's wishes will also be approved, even where the wisdom, in hindsight, may be dubious,
on the ground that counsel has control of the decisional process and must have such control
to be effective.
Id.
147. Courts routinely hold that counsel's decision to give up control of a tactical call will not be
lightly disturbed. See, e.g., People v. Gadson, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 219, 224-27 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (holding
that counsel's decision to defer to client's wishes to call two witnesses to the stand against counsel's advice
was not constitutionally deficient representation).
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considers whether defense counsel's action or inaction with respect to a
particular strategic decision constituted deficient or inadequate
representation.'48 Occasionally, the court will specifically determine
whether counsel's failure to involve a defendant in the decisionmaking
process, or counsel's refusal to follow the client's expressed wishes
regarding a strategic decision, rendered counsel's representation
inadequate.'49 More typically, however, a state court will not focus on
how counsel ought to have resolved a strategic disagreement with the
defendant, but whether counsel's conduct in the case fell below a
minimal level of competence.
Aware of the limited decisions deemed fundamental and reserved for
the client by the Constitution, 50 state judges usually are reluctant to
expand the scope of a criminal defendant's decisionmaking power.
Granting criminal defendants greater control over strategic decisions not
only interferes with the professional independence of defense counsel,
it also may intensify friction between counsel and defendant thus
threatening the orderly, efficient administration of the courts.151
Accordingly, courts routinely find that as long as counsel exercised
reasonable professional judgment when she made the particular
strategic or tactical decision at issue, defense counsel's representation
was constitutionally adequate.'52 State appellate opinions, therefore,
generally promote the traditional lawyer-centered approach to
decisionmaking by holding that the defendant is bound by counsel's
strategic and tactical judgment calls even though the accused may not
have been consulted'53 or may have disagreed with counsel's strategy. 5 4
148. See, e.g., State v. Doppler, 590 N.W.2d 627,633-35 (Minn. 1999) (declaring that counsel's failure
to present evidence or call witnesses were tactical matters within counsel's discretion and that court would
not review the competency of such tactical decisions).
149. See, e.g., State v. Lee, 689 P.2d 153, 157-64 (Ariz. 1984) (en banc); State v. Davis, 506 A.2d 86,
88-92 (Conn. 1986).
150. See supra notes 13, 76-144 and accompanying text.
151. See People v. Williams, 471 P.2d 1008, 1015-16 (Cal. 1970) (expressing concern that
disagreements over trial tactics would add to expense of furnishing counsel, delay trials, and embarrass
effective prosecution of crime).
152. See, e.g., Sellers v. State, 889 P.2d 895,898 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (holding that trial counsel's
decision to pursue defense of "automatism" instead ofinsanity defense was reasonable and not ineffective).
153. See, e.g., Van Alstine v. State, 426 S.E.2d 360, 363 (Ga. 1993) (holding that failure ofdefense
counsel to consult with defendantabout requesting lesser included instructions did not constitute ineffective
assistance of counsel because lawyer made strategic choice, consistent with defendant's feeling about the
case); State v.Johnson, 714 S.W.2d 752, 766-67 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (finding that counsel properly made
strategic decision to allow admission of inadmissible evidence without consulting with the defendant
because decisions other than fundamental decisions made during trial are necessarily for lawyer alone
without advice from defendant).
154. See, e.g., People v. Turner, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 358, 362 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (confirming that all
non-fundamental strategic calls, including the selection ofwitnesses, are subject to counsel's control "despite
differences ofopinion or even open objections from the defendant"); People v. Ramey, 604 N.E.2d 275,
HeinOnline  -- 68 U. Cin. L. Rev. 791 1999-2000
792 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LA WREVIEW [Vol.68
Although state court opinions echo Strickland v. Washington in giving
lawyers almost unchallengeable authority to make strategic and tactical
decisions,' 55 these opinions do not necessarily demand that lawyers
follow a traditional decisionmaking approach. Rather, statejudges, like
their federal counterparts, have been quite willing to find that a lawyer
has rendered constitutionally adequate and effective representation even
though counsel permitted her client to make a strategic decision that is
typically made by counsel.'56 In fact, in some cases, state court judges
have championed the right of a defendant to make strategic decisions
contrary to those proposed by counsel.'57
On the specific issue of who ultimately controls the selection of
witnesses, caselaw is split. The vast majority of state courts that have
confronted the question have resolved the issue by declaring it a tactical
matter to be decided by defense counsel.' Contrasting fundamental
281 (Il1. 1992) (inding that counsel is not ineffective despite presenting self-defense theory contrary to
defendant's wishes).
155. See, e.g., Briones v. State, 848 P.2d 966,977 (Haw. 1993) ("[a]n informed, tactical decision will
rarely be second-guessed byjudicial hindsight").
156. See, e.g., State v. Buchanan, 410 S.E.2d 832, 835 (N.C. 1991) (holding that defendant cannot
complain because counsel acquiesced to defendant's wishes not to remove certain jurors counsel deemed
unsuitable); State v. McDowell, 407 S.E.2d 200, 209-10 (N.C. 1991) (ruling that defense counsel is not
ineffective fordeferring to client's wishes whether to pass or strike certainjurors); People v. Galan, 261 Cal.
Rptr. 834,835-36 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (finding that counsel is not ineffective for calling witness at client's
insistence). A defendant whose lawyer follows the defendant's instructions regarding a strategic trial
decision generallywill not be able to complain successfullyon appeal that the lawyer acted unprofessionally
in abiding by the client's wishes. See, e.g.,Jeffries v. Blodgett, 5 F.3d 1180, 1198 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding that
counsel's failure to present mitigating evidence was not ineffective assistance because counsel acquisced to
defendanit's wishes that evidence not be presented); State v. Rubenstein, 531 N.E.2d 732, 740 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1987) (finding counsel was not ineffective for waiving cross examination ofstate witnesses, stipulating
to psychiatric report and waiving opening argument pursuant to defendant's instructions); In re Trombly,
627 A.2d 855, 856-57 (Vt. 1993) (insisting that defendant who chose, contrary to lawyer's advice, not to
ask for lesser-included instruction, could not complain that counsel was ineffective for deferring to the
defendant's wishes). But see State v. Lee, 689 P.2d 153, 158-59 (Ariz. 1984) (in bane) (deciding that defense
counsel provided deficient representation when he acquiesced to defendant's demand to call witnesses
whose veracity counsel doubted).
157. See, e.g., State v. Thomas, 625 S.W.2d 115, 123-24 (Mo. 1981) (counsel acted properly in
deferring to client's unsound strategy that defense witnesses supporting mental defense not be called); State
v. Brown, 451 S.E.2d 181, 186-87 (N.C. 1994) (trial court acted properly in ordering counsel to follow
defendant's wishes regarding trial strategy); State v. Ali, 407 S.E.2d 183, 189 (N.C. 1991) (lawyer not
ineffective for permitting client to make decision not to peremptorily challenge ajuror counsel wanted to
remove); People v. Petrovich, 664 N.E.2d 503,503-04 (N.Y. 1996) (when client and counsel disagree about
decision whether to request lesser included instruction, choice ultimately is defendant's, who is bound by
that choice even if it turns out poorly); Commonwealth v. Sam, 635 A.2d 603, 611-12 (Pa. 1993)
(defendant had right to direct counsel not to introduce or argue mitigating evidence in the penalty phase).
158. See State v. Davis, 506 A.2d 86, 89 (Conn. 1986); State v.Johnson, 901 S.W.2d 60, 63 (Mo.
1995) (en banc); People v. Smith, 31 A.D.2d 847, 848 (N.Y. App. Div. 1969); Ridley v. State, 510 S.E.2d
113, 119 (Ga. App. 1998); State v. Lee, 689 P.2d 153, 159 (Ariz. 1984) (in bane); Winter v. State, 502
P.2d 733, 738 (Kan. 1972); State v. Voorhees, 596 N.W.2d 241, 255 (Minn. 1999); People v. Barrow, 549
N.E.2d 240, 248-49 (I1. 1989); People v. Williams, 471 P.2d 1008, 1015-17 (Cal. 1970); State v.
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rights reserved personally for the defendant with other strategic
decisions involved in the management of a criminal case, these courts
view the selection of witnesses as a management decision better left to
counsel.' 59 In some cases, courts have articulated the advantages of
placing this responsibility in counsel's hands: counsel is better trained
to decide such an issue, 6 ' there is insufficient time to permit clients to
make informed tactical choices, 6' and few competent lawyers would
defend criminal cases if they had to take the time to consult with the
defendant and follow the client's views on every issue of trial strategy. 62
Generally, however, the opinions offer little but the conclusory
observation that the selection of witnesses is a tactical decision that is
within counsel's province. 6
A few courts have taken a different tact. In Blanco v. State,'6' the
Florida Supreme Court rejected appellant's claim that the trial court
erred in permitting him to call witnesses to testify contrary to counsel's
advice.'65 Appellant persuaded the trial court that he be allowed to call
Rubenstein, 531 N.E.2d 732, 740 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987); State v. Pratts, 366 A.2d 1327, 1333-34 (NJ.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975); Falkner v. State, 462 So.2d 1040, 1041-42 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984); Aragon
v. State, 760 P.2d 1174, 1179 (Idaho 1988); People v. Schultheis, 638 P.2d 8, 12 (Colo. 1981) (en banc);
Bell v. State, 733 So.2d 372, 375 (Miss. 1999); Phillips v. State, 989 P.2d 1017 (Okla. Crim. App. 1999);
Stoppleworth v. State, 501 N.W.2d 325, 328 (N.D. 1993); People v. Morris, 163 N.W.2d 16,18-19 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1968); In re King, 336 A.2d 195, 198 (Vt. 1975); State v. Orosco, 833 P.2d 1155, 1163 (N.M.
Ct. App. 1991); Grandison v. State, 670 A.2d 398, 440 (Md. App. 1996); State v. Schwehm, 713 So.2d
697, 706 (La. Ct. App. 1998); Commonwealth v. Stokes, 408 N.E.2d 887, 889-90 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980);
State v. Tome, 742 P.2d 479, 482 (Mont. 1987); State.v. Lindsay, 517 N.W.2d 102, 107 (Neb. 1994);
State v. Love, 865 P.2d 322, 325-28 (Nev. 1993); State v. Glidden, 499 A.2d 1349, 1351 (N.H. 1985);
State ex rel.Juv. Dept. v. Geist, 796 P.2d 1193, 1203 (Or. 1990); Jacques v. State, 669 A.2d 1124, 1149-50
(R.I. 1995); Hofer v. Class, 578 N.W.2d 583, 587-88 (S.D. 1998); Commonwealth v. Porter, 569 A.2d
942, 945-46 (Pa. 1990); Jackson v.'State, 495 S.E.2d 768, 769-70 (S.C. 1998); In reJeffries, 752 P.2d
1338, 1341-42 (Wash. 1988); Hamburg v. State, 820 P.2d 523,528 (Wyo. 1991); Annas v. State, 726 P.2d
552, 559 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986); Johnson v. Riddle, 281 S.E.2d 843,846 (Va. 1981); Ex parte Wellborn,
785 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex. Grim. App. 1990); State v. Kone, 557 N.W.2d 97, 102 (Iowa App. 1996);
State v. Tyler, 850 P.2d 1250,1256 (Utah 1993); State v. Kerley, 820 S.W.2d 753, 756 (Tenn. Grim. App.
1991); Helton v. State, 924 S.W.2d 239,242-43 (Ark. 1996); State v. Miller, 459 S.E.2d 114, 127 (W. Va.
1995); Moore v. Commonwealth, 983 S.W.2d 479, 484 (Ky. 1998); State v. Elm, 549 N.W.2d 471,476
(Wis. Ct. App. 1996).
159. See, e.g., In re Horton, 813 P.2d 1335, 1342 (Cal. 1991) (en banc); State v. Davis, 506 A.2d 86,
89 (Conn. 1986); State v. Pratts, 366 A.2d 1327, 1333 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975).
160. See People v.Johnson, 581 N.E.2d 118, 124-25 (Ill. App. 1991); Lee, 689 P.2d at 159; Levesque
v. State, 664 A.2d 849, 852 (Me. 1995).
161. See People v. Williams, 471 P.2d 1008, 1015-17 (Cal. 1970) (en banc).
162. See, e.g., Fa~lner, 462 So. 2d at 1042 (citing Nelson v. California, 346 F.2d 73,81 (9th Cir. 1965)).
163. See, e.g., Outten v. State, 720 A.2d 547, 557 (Del. 1998); Ridlty, 510 S.E.2d at 119; State v.
DeGuzman, 701 P.2d 1287, 1291 (Haw. 1985); State v.Jones, 392 N.W.2d 224,236*(Minn. 1986); State
v. Pratts, 365 A.2d 928, 929 (NJ. 1976) (per curiam); Ortiz v. State, 866 S.W.2d 312, 315 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1993).
164. 452 So.2d 520 (Fla. 1984).
165. Id. at 524.
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the witnesses despite counsel's insistence that the testimony would be
detrimental to the defendant's case and not in his best interests.
66
Agreeing with the trial court, the Florida Supreme Court concluded
summarily that the decision to present whatever evidence the defendant
feels is beneficial ultimately is the defendant's.'67 Defense counsel's role
is to present to the defendant alternative courses of action, but not to
make tactical decisions at odds with a defendant's wishes.
68
Accordingly, if attorney and client disagree as to a matter of trial
strategy, the defendant must be permitted the final say.'69
Similarly, the Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama rejected the
argument that the trial court interfered with the proper functioning of
the attorney-client relationship by allowing a defendant to call two
witnesses to testify contrary to counsel's advice. 7 ' Looking to language
from Rule 1.2 of the Alabama Rules of Professional Conduct that
requires lawyers to abide by a client's decisions concerning the
objectives of representation, the court declared that counsel "can only
make recommendations to a client as to how to conduct his defense; the
ultimate decision, however, lies with the client."'' The trial court acted
properly, therefore, in honoring the defendant's wishes.'72
Finally, the North Carolina Supreme Court agrees with the majority
of courts that responsibility for tactical decisions such as what witnesses
to call normally must rest with defense counsel.'73 Nevertheless, if
defense counsel and a fully informed criminal defendant reach an
"absolute impasse" as to a tactical decision, the client's wishes must
control.' 74 In State v. Al,' 75 defendant and his two defense lawyers
disagreed whether to exercise a peremptory challenge to a prospective
juror. The defendant wanted to seat the juror against the
recommendations of both defense lawyers. As suggested by the
166. See id.
167. See id. The court cited only Millgan v. State, 177 So.2d 75 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965) in support
of its conclusion.
168. See Cain v. Suite, 565 So.2d 875, 876 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (counsel properly deferred to
defendant's selection ofjurors after advising defendant to select different jurors).
169. See Anderson v. State, 574 So.2d 87,95 (Fla. 1991) (Barkett,J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (observing that defendant has the right to call or choose not to call a witness); Blanco v.
Wainwright, 507 So.2d 1377, 1383 (Fla. 1987) (stating that conflict between counsel and defendant over
strategy or tactics should be resolved in defendant's favor).
170. See Burton v. State, 651 So.2d 641, 656 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993).
171. Id.
172. Other than Rule 1.2, the court did not discuss any authority in its brief treatment of this issue.
173. See State v. Wilkinson, 474 S.E.2d 375, 382 (N.C. 1996); State v. McDowell, 407 S.E.2d 200,
211 (N.C. 1991).
174. See State v. Ali, 407 S.E.2d 183, 189 (N.C. 1991).
175. Id.
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American Bar Association Standards for CriminalJustice, '76 the lawyers
made a record of their disagreement before the trial court, but
ultimately deferred to the defendant's wishes. '77 Approving the conduct
of defendant's defense lawyers, the Ali court looked to caselaw
confirming that the attorney-client relationship rested on principles of
agency. 8 Accordingly, the court concluded that the principal-agent
nature of the relationship demands that tactical disagreements be
resolved consistent with the client's desires.
As subsequent cases demonstrate, however, attorneys in North
Carolina still exercise considerable control over the decision to call
witnesses. Absent an absolute impasse, the selection of the witnesses to
call is within the province of counsel after consultation with the
defendant. '79 Defendants who fail to voice their complaints or wishes to
the trial court regarding their lawyers' tactical decisions will not be able
to argue successfully on appeal that they were deprived of their right to
control strategic decisionmaking l' Moreover, if counsel refuses to defer
to the defendant's wishes and the trial court sides with defense counsel,
then what appears to be an "absolute impasse" may be characterized
only as a "mere disagreement" over trial strategy or tactics. " As such,
a strategic choice based on counsel's professional opinion that a witness
need not be called to testify will not be found to have deprived the
defendant of his constitutional rights nor constitute ineffective assistance
of counsel.'82
D. Professional Standards and Decisionmaking Responsibility
Finally, it behooves the student or criminal practitioner wrestling with
the Brown issue to know how other conscientious criminal defense
lawyers recommend handling the issue. The most authoritative
statement of the prevailing norms of criminal defense lawyers can be
found in the American Bar Association Standards for CriminalJustice
(ABA Standards).' Certainly other nationally recognized standards
176. See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINALJUSTICE Standard 4-5.2 (2d ed. 1980); STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINALJUSTICE Standard 4-5.2 (3d ed. 1993).
177. See State v. Ali, 407 S.E.2d at 188-89.
178. See id. at 189.
179. See State v. Wilkinson, 474 S.E.2d 375, 382 (N.C. 1996).
180. See State v. McCarver, 462 S.E.2d 25, 36 (N.C. 1995).
181. See State v. Gary, 501 S.E.2d 57, 61-62 (N.C. 1998).
182. See id. at 62.
183. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE (3d ed. 1993). The American Bar Association
promulgated the first edition of the Defense Function Standards in 1971. On February 3, 1992, the ABA
House of Delegates approved the present edition of the Defense Function Standards and that version is
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offer some guidance to lawyers striving to carry out the duty to render
zealous, effective representation."' The ABA Standards, however,
represent the most widely cited set of guidelines describing the duties of
a lawyer charged with the responsibility to defend a person accused of
a crime.' 85
ABA Standard 4-5.2, "' entitled "Control and Direction of the Case,"
substantially tracks the division ofdecisionmaking responsibility between
counsel and a criminal defendant set forth in Model Rule 1.2(a) and the
majority opinion in Jones v. Barnes. That Standard provides:
(a) Certain decisions relating to the conduct of the case are ultimately
for the accused and others are ultimately for defense counsel. The
decisions which are to be made by the accused after full consultation
with counsel include:
(i) what pleas to enter;
(ii) whether to accept a plea agreement;
(iii) whether to waive jury trial'
(iv) whether to testify in his or her own behalf; and
(v) whether to appeal.
(b) Strategic and tactical decisions should be made by defense counsel
after consultation with the client where feasible and appropriate.
Such decisions include what witnesses to call, whether and how to
conduct cross examination, whatjurors to accept or strike, what trial
motions should be made, and what evidence should be introduced.
(c) If a disagreement on significant matters of tactics or strategy arises
between defense counsel and the client, defense counsel should make
a record of the circumstances, counsel's advice and reasons, and the
conclusion reached. The record should be made in a manner which
protects the confidentiality of the lawyer-client relationship. 18 7
As the commentary points out, Standard 4-5.2 adds to the fundamental
decisions reserved tothe defendant by Jones and by Model Rule 1.2(a),
by specifically including the decision to accept or reject a proffered plea
agreement. 8' This addition is hardly controversial. Rather, the
settlement decision is so closely intertwined with the decision regarding
contained in the third edition of the ABA's Standards for Criminaijustice. The ABA Standards have been
cited with approval in countless decisions and generally acknowledged to represent the "prevailing norms
of practice." See, e.g., Stricklimd, 466 U.S. at 688.
184. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAIV GOVERNING LAWYERS (Proposed Final Draft
1998). For another set of well-crafted standards expressly designed to aid criminal defense lawyers,
PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR CRIMINAL DEFENSE REPRESENTATION (1995) (National Legal Aid and.
Defender Ass'n) [hereinafter PERFORIMANCE GUIDELINES].
185. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688 (acknowledging the importance of the ABA Standards).
186. STANDARDS FOR GRIMINALJUSTICE Standard 4-5.2 (3d ed. 1993).
187. Id.
188. STANDARDS FOR CRINIINALJUSTICE Standard 4-5.2, commentary at 201 (3d ed. 1993).
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the plea to enter that it is almost inconceivable that anyone would claim
that such a decision is the lawyer's. 89
ABA Standard 4-5.2 directs the lawyer to give the defendant the
benefit of counsel's careful advice and full experience before the
defendant makes any of the decisions designated as fundamental. It is
the client, not counsel, who has the final say in these decisions because
these decisions are "so crucial to the accused's fate."'90 ABA Standard
4-5.2 fails to acknowledge, however, that many strategic and tactical
decisions may be critical to the outcome of a trial and, therefore, equally
crucial to the defendant's fate. Arguably, a defendant should be
afforded final control over any trial-related decision that is reasonably
likely to affect the outcome of his case. Instead, ABA Standard 4-5.2
opts to promote lawyer autonomy by giving ultimate responsibility for
all strategic and tactical case decisions to defense counsel.
The commentary to Standard 4-5.2 proclaims the advantages of the
lawyer-centered approach. Given the complexity of many of the
defendant's rights, it is very time consuming and, frequently, futile to
expect lawyers to provide a meaningful explanation to most clients as to
how to exercise their rights.' 92 In addition, many tactical decisions must
be made during trial without adequate time for consultation.'93 Finally,
even when decisions can be anticipated so that consultation is
appropriate, the decisions ultimately should rest with counsel "[b] ecause
these decisions require the skill, training, and experience of the
advocate."' 94 In the end, because the lawyer knows best, the lawyer
should have the power to make all strategic and tactical decisions.
The full extent of the lawyer's decisionmaking power under ABA
Standard 4-5.2 is revealed by the fact that defehse counsel's duty to
consult about trial strategy and tactics is subject to the lawyer's
judgment that such consultation is "feasible and appropriate."'195
189. See Keith N. Bystrom, Communicating Plea Offers tothe Client, inETHICAL PROBLEMS FACING THE
CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYER - PRACTICALANSWERS TO TOUGH QUESTIONS 84,89 (RodncyJ. Uphoff
ed., 1995). See also Uphoff& Wood, supra note 31, at 39-40 (noting that less than l% of the responding
public defenders indicated that if there were a disagreement about the decision to accept or reject a plea
bargain, the final call was for counsel).
190. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINALJUSTICE Standard 4-5.2, commentary at 201 (3d ed. 1993).
191. See id. at 201-02.
192. See id. at 202.
193. See id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 201. In the history of the third edition of Standard 4-5.2, it is noted that the language
"where feasible and appropriate" was added "to reflect the fact that sometimes consultation is virtually
impossible, e.g., in the middle ofcross-examination." STANDARDS FOR CRIMINALJUSTICE Standard 4-5.2,
history at 200. Certainly there are circumstances, especially in the middle oftrial, when client consultation
is impractical and unworkable. Nevertheless, the "feasible and appropriate" language and similar language
in the commentary to other ABA provisions provides too much cover for those lawyers who fail to consult
HeinOnline  -- 68 U. Cin. L. Rev. 797 1999-2000
798 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LA W REVIEW [Vol.68
Admittedly, lawyers are encouraged "ordinarily" to consult with the
client before making some strategic decisions, "especially those involving
which witnesses to call."'9 6  Nevertheless, the lawyer is given the
professional discretion to make many important decisions without any
need to consult with the defendant if the lawyer feels doing so is
inappropriate or unfeasible.
The ABA Standards do suggest that, in some limited situations, a
lawyer should defer to the strategic preferences of the defendant.
Indeed, the Brown case arguably represents one such situation. As the
commentary to ABA Standard 4-3.1 explains, "[i]n questions of meahs,
the lawyer should assume responsibility for technical and legal, strategic
and tactical issues, such as what witnesses to call . . . [b]ut defense
counsel should consult with his or her client on these questions where
such consultation is feasible, and counsel should defer to the client
regarding such questions as the expense to be incurred and concern for
third persons who might be adversely Affected." 97 Accordingly, because
Brown's insistence that his father not be called as a witness is based on
Brown's concern for his father's health, a criminal practitioner may read
Standard 4-3.1 to require counsel to defer to Brown's choice. It is likely
that the drafters of the ABA Standards wanted to encourage lawyers to
respect a client's concern that a particular tactic not be used to hurt a
third person. It is doubtful, however, that the drafters of the ABA
Standards truly intended that a lawyer be deferential when the client's
concern involves an insistence on an unsound strategic choice that is
likely to cause significant harm to the client.
IV. RESOLVING T-E STRATEGIC IMPASSE: To RESPECT OR TO
OVERRIDE THE DEFENDANT'S STRATEGY?
A. A Framework for Analyzing the Issue
How then should the criminal practitioner committed to providing
quality representation resolve the impasse presented by the Brown case?
Unquestionably, the criminal defense lawyer is obligated to further the
client's interest to the fullest extent possible within the bounds of the
law. '98 Like Abbe Smith and William Montross, I agree that most
with their c lients. See, e.g., STANDARDS FORCRIMINALJUSTICI'Standard 4-3.9, commentary at 178 (noting
that counsel is not expected to describe trial or negotiation strategy to client in deail, but "ordinarily should
consult the client on tactics that might injure or coerce others").
196. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINALJUSTICE Standard 4-5.2, commentary at 202 (3d cd. 1993).
197. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINALJUSTICE Standard 4-3.1, commentary at 148 (3d ed. 1993).
198. See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318-19 (1981) (holding that delense counsel best
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criminal defense lawyers, in fact, view loyalty or fidelity to the client to
be the cornerstone and governing virtue of criminal defense practice.'99
Thus, for many criminal practitioners, "fidelity to the client is the virtue
that trumps all other values and virtues. 200 Nevertheless, even if this
client-above-all perspective shapes the way most defense lawyers resolve
difficult ethical questions, it does not answer the question of how this
decisionmaking dilemma should be untangled. Rather, a lawyer's sense
of fidelity may drive counsel to make the tactical choice to call Brown's
father in order to ensure that Brown's best interests are protected while
another lawyer, equally loyal to Brown, may defer to her client's
strategic choice to promote Brown's autonomy and dignity. In the end,
conscientious counsel may be forced to choose whether to respect
Brown's wishes or to impose counsel's own strategic choice on the client
by calling the father as a Witness despite the defendant's objections. In
making such a decision, counsel inevitably faces a tough judgment call,
a call that necessarily requires a choice between conflicting values. In
my view, counsel should strive to promote client autonomy by
respecting the client's strategic wishes to the fullest extent possible.
Nonetheless, in some circumstances, a good lawyer will override a
client's wishes and refuse to follow the dubious strategic instructions of
a client in order to protect the client from serious harm. 0 '
Defense counsel's power to override her client's strategic wishes on a
tactical matter traditionally allocated to counsel should be exercised
sparingly. Liberal use of this power robs clients of their freedom of
choice. I propose, therefore, that lawyers locked in a strategic impasse
with a defendant analyze and balance four factors-the client's capacity
for making an informed choice, the reasons for the client's proposed
choice, the degree of harm facing the client, and the likelihood of that
harm occurring-before deciding how to act. As the following
variations of the Brown case reveal, using such a framework will not
eliminate the difficulty of counsel's call. It may, however, assist lawyers
serves the public by advancing the "undivided interests" of the client); STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE Standard 4-1.2, commentary at 122-23 (3d ed. 1993).
199. See Abbe Smith & William Montross, The Calling of Criminal Defense, 50 MERCER L. REV. 443,
517-35 (1999). For similar views, see generally DAVID MELLINKOFF, THE CONSCIENCE OF A LAWYER
(1973); KENNETH MANN, DEFENDING WHITE-COLIAR CRIME: APORTRAITOFATTORNEYS AT WORK
(1985); FREEDMAN, supra note 9.
200. Smith and Montross, supra note 199, at 522.
201. For a thoughtful look at the merits oferiminal practitioners employing surrogate decisionmaking
to resolve the dilemma posed by the mentally ill criminal defendant seeking to control defense strategy, see
Josephine Ross, Autonomy Versus A Client's Best Interests: The Defense Lawyer's Dilemma When Mentally Ill Clients
Seek to Control Their Defense, 35 AM. GRIM. L. REV. 1343 (1998).
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to exercise wisely the professional judgment demanded of them when
counsel and client disagree about a particular strategic decision.
1. Discussing the Issue Thoroughly
Presumably when Brown expressed his wish that his father not be
called to testify, defense counsel thoroughly and carefully discussed the
matter with him. Nonetheless, counsel should begin the task of resolving
the dispute she and her client face by re-examining the position of each
side to make certain that an impasse, in fact, exists. Miscommunication,
a common problem between lawyers and clients, may have led to a
misunderstanding about the issue in question. It is not unusual for
parties to a dispute to misperceive the other side's position and to be
locked in a dispute that has no basis in fact. Thus, counsel needs to
ensure both that she understands the client's true position and that she
has made herself and her position clearly understood.
Defense counsel starts this process of re-examining each other's
position by carefully restating for Brown her rationale for calling the
father as a witness. It is not enough that counsel may have already
stated her reasons. Rather, counsel's goal is to provide her client
information in a manner that enables the client to process counsel's
explanation." 2
• Giving clients a clear, accurate picture of the legal predicament they
face is essential to good lawyering." 3 As good lawyers recognize,
however, many factors may produce miscommunication between
counsel and criminal defendant and, in turn, generate a
misunderstanding. In providing a client information about an
important case decision, therefore, counsel must explain the decision in
a manageable, coherent fashion using language and a process that
actually facilitates client understanding." 4 In addition, counsel must
work to eliminate distractors-such as other people in the discussion,
202. A full discussion of the essentials of effective lawyer-client communication is well beyond the
scope of this article. For a sampling of the many books and articles on the subject, see BINDER, ETAL., supra
note 11; R. M. BASTRESS &J.D. HARBAUGH, INTERVIEWING, COUNSELING,AND NEGOTIATING: SKILLS
FOR EFFEcTIVE REPRESENTATION (1990); STEFAN H. KRIEGER, ET AL., ESSENTIAL LAWYERING SKILLS
(1999); GOCHRANJR., ETAL.,supra note 19; Gay Gellhorn, Law and Language."An Empirically -BasedModel
for the Opening Moments of Client Interviews, 4 CLINICAL L. REV. 321 (1998); Hurder, supra note 20; Clark D.
Cunningham, 7he Lawyer as Translator, Representation as Text: Towards an Ethnography of Legal Discourse, 77
CORNELLL. REV. 1298 (1992).
203. See STANDARDS FOR GRIMINALJUS-ICE Standard 4-5.1 (3d ed. 1993); Gaines v. Hopper, 575
F.2d 1147, 1149-50 (5th Git. 1978) ("[i]nformed evaluation of potential defenses to criminal charges and
meaningful discussion with one's client of the realities of his case are cornerstones of effective assistance of
counsel").
204. See KRIEGER, ETAL., supra note 202, at 207-09; COCHRANJR., ETAL., supra note 19, at 133-35.
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interruptions, or other pressing matters-that interfere with the client's
ability to hear or to absorb counsel's explanation. Finally, counsel
should be sensitive to and strive to minimize the negative effects that
racial, cultural, or class differences may have on her communication
with the defendant.25
During this discussion, it is critical that counsel ascertain if her client
fully appreciates both the risks involved in the decision not to call the
father and the consequences that are likely to follow from such a
decision. Brown must be told in no uncertain terms that Brown's father
is an essential witness whose absence will hamper the presentation of the
defense case to such an extent, that the chances or odds of success at
trial will be greatly reduced.. In my experience, lawyers who provide
their clients predictions or estimates using a range of percentage terms,
albeit necessarily inexact, are most likely to be understood.0 6 People are
accustomed to thinking of risk taking by weighing the odds of a certain
result or of a event occurring. Vague pronouncements, couched in
terms such as "good," "fairly strong" or "weak" to describe the client's
prospects at trial, are of limited help. 2 7 Rather, the lawyer must
communicate this information in terms that make sense to the defendant
and clarify, not obfuscate, the risks the defendant faces.20 8
Once defense counsel is satisfied that the defendant is fully aware of
counsel's position-and presumably still maintains that he does not wish
his father to testify-then counsel should ask Brown to clarify the
reasons for his position. It is important, of course, that counsel actually
listen to her client, not merely feign interest in the client's reasons.20 9
The process of learning more about the client's position may require
counsel to push for specifics. That is, defense counsel may have to
probe to find out more details about the father's health status. Counsel
should learn when the father last saw a doctor and the nature of any
specific medical problem he is experiencing. Additionally, it would be
important for defense counsel to find out as much as possible about
Brown's discussion with his father about the issue of the father testifying
at trial. In particular, counsel needs to know whether the father has
205. See KRIEGER ET AL., supra note 202, at 13. Gender differences in some cases also may inhibit
communication between counsel and client and need to be addressed specifically. For a look at how the
contrasting communication styles of men and women cause communication problems, see DEBORAH
TANNEN, YOUJUST DON'T UNDERSTAND: WOMEN AND MEN IN CONVERSATION (1990).
206. See BINDER ET AL., supra note 11, at 337-45.
207. See KRIEGER ET AL., supra note 202, at 197-98.
208. See AU-ABA COMMITIEEON CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION, SKILLS AND ETHICS
IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 51-2 (1993); COCHRANJR., ET AL., supra note 19, at 126-29.
209. For a discussion of the importance of the skill of good listening for the successful lawyer, see
Gellhorn, supra note 202, at 322-350; Steve Keeva, Bgyondthe Words, A.B.A.J.,Jan. 1999, at 60-63.
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expressed a definite opinion regarding testifying and the father's
openness to additional discussions on the subject. Finally, counsel must
ascertain how entrenched Brown actually is in his position.
As experienced lawyers recognize, pushing a criminal defendant for
details must be done tactfully. Cross-examining a client in such an
instance rarely yields helpful information and may only make the client
more intransigent. The goal is open communication and to achieve that
end a lawyer facing the type of impasse posed in the Brown case needs
to be able to draw upon the solid, trusting relationship she already has
forged with her client. If lawyer and client do not have such a
relationship, it is unlikely that they will be able to communicate
effectively about the impasse.21
2. Barriers to Attorney-Client Communication
Most appointed criminal defense lawyers are painfully aware of the
difficulties they confront in establishing good lines of communication
with their clients. Good communication is generally built upon trust,
but, unfortunately, few criminal defendants start out fully trusting their
appointed lawyer.21' And why should they? Most indigent defendants
find themselves ensnared in an elaborate, complicated legal system that
already treats them as guilty and threatens them with more punishment.
The procedures and language used are alien and, at times, nearly
incomprehensible. All of the other actors in this formalized
environment, including the lawyer foisted upon the defendant by the
State, move easily and freely in the system, laughing with each other
over inside jokes.1 2 Not surprisingly, many criminal defendants feel
isolated and mistrustful of their appointed representatives.213
210. See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINALJUSTICE Standard 4-3.1(a) (urging counsel to seek to establish
a relationship of trust and confidence); Welsh S. White, Effective Assistance of Counsel in Capital Cases: The
Evolving Standard of Care, 1993 U. ILL. L. REv. 323, 337-40, 374-76 (stressing that establishing a trusting
relationship is a prerequisite to effective representation).
211. SeeJones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 761 (1983) (Brennan,J., dissenting); IUSAJ. MCINTYRE, THE
PUBLIC DEFENDER 62-73 (1987); Roy B. Flemming, Client Games; DefenseAttorney Perspetiveson TheirRelations
with Criminal Clients, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES.J. 253, 254-260.
212. Numerous commentators have described the manner in which the criminaljustice system works
to reward regular players - the insiders - while making it difficult for those outside the system to understand
the actual rules of the game. See, e.g., ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, THE BEST DEFENSE xiii-xxii (1982);
Abraham S. Blumberg, The Pracice of Law as Confulence Game: Organizational Cooptation of a Profession, LAW &
SOc'VY REV.,June 1967, at 15.
213. For a detailed look at the factors that breed mistrust and friction between criminal defendants
and appointed counsel, see Robert A. Burt, Conflict and Trust Between Attorney and Client, 69 GEO. LJ. 1015
(1981). See alsoJONATHAN D. CASPER, CRIMINAL COURTS: THE DEFENDANT'S PERSPECTIVE 100-25
(1978).
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Although not easy, it certainly is possible for appointed lawyers to
overcome their clients' misgivings and to win their clients' trust.
Gaining a defendant's confidence generally demands time, energy, and
an empathetic attitude." 4 The lawyer must display competence and
self-confidence, while still honestly acknowledging one's limitations.
Counsel may need to reassure her clients by promising to make up for
those limitations with hard work. The conscientious lawyer then
delivers on that promise, not by guaranteeing any particular result, but
by working tirelessly on the client's behalf.
Good lawyers strive to treat their clients with respect and to present
the client's story in a manner that does not silence the client's voice.2"5
Yet, the fact that Brown and his lawyer find themselves locked in a
dispute over a strategic decision does hot demonstrate that Brown and
his lawyer have a flawed relationship. Indeed, Brown may trust counsel
and have confidence in her abilities, yet still disagree with the counsel's
recommended strategic choice. Moreover, the fact that defense counsel
continues to push Brown to allow the father to be called to the witness
stand does not necessarily mean that counsel has not listened to or
understood Brown's concerns.
216
Nevertheless, establishing and maintaining a good lawyer-client
relationship often involves considerable effort. Because lawyers and
clients are different people with different needs, they may have to
overcome a number of obstacles to achieve a healthy relationship.1 7
Just as in a good marriage, however, the normal stress and strain of even
a good attorney-client relationship means that problems still will be
encountered. A good attorney-client relationship-or successful marital
relationship-takes advantage of good lines of communication,
214. For a discussion of the importance of empathy for those doing criminal defense work, see
Ogletree, supra note 35, at 1242-43, 1271-75. See also White, supra note 210, at 337-40, 374-76.
215. See Cunningham, supra note 202, 1299-1300; COCHRANJR., ETAL., supra note 19, at 20-30.
216. Good lawyeing frequently demands that counsel attempt to persuade a client that taking certain
action or making a particular decision is unwise or contrary to the client's best interest. In offering advice,
counsel is to avoid undue influence and manipulation but is to use "reasonable persuasion." STANDARDS
FOR CRIMINALJUSTICE Standard 4-5.1, commentary at 198 (3d ed. 1993). See also STANDARD FOR
CRIMINALJUSTICE Standard 4-5.2, commentary at 201-02 (3d ed. 1993) (urging lawyers not to improperly
coerce clients to follow their recommendations, but to use "fair persuasion" when counseling clients). For
a look at the difficulty of the counseling task facing the criminal defense lawyer and of determining what
constitutes reasonable persuasion, see Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role in Plea Bargaining, 84
YALE LJ. 1179, 1306-13 (1975); Abbe Smith, Rosie O'Neill Goes to Law Schook The Clinical Education of the
SensitiveNewAge PublicDefendr, 28 HARV. CR-CL. L. REV. 1,27-37 (1993); RodneyJ. Uphoff, The Criminal
Defense Lawyer as Effective Negotiator: A Systemic Approach, 2 CLINICAL L. REV. 73, 83, 131-32 (1995).
217. For an insightful account ofthe problems even well-intentioned, caring lawyers encounter when
they fall to recognize their client's differences and to translate effectively their client's story, see
Cunningham, supra note 202. For a look at the barriers that commonly inhibit lawyer-client
communication, see BINDER, ET AL., supra note 11, at 34-40.
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however, to resolve problems or disputes that arise. Generally, then, the
better the attorney-client relationship, the less likely it will be that the
client ultimately will refuse to agree to counsel's recommended
strategy. 18
3. Contacting the Father
If Brown's lawyer has taken the time to create a solid relationship
with her client, then the client is less likely to feel threatened by
counsel's inquiries about his father's health or about the defendant's
reasons for his insistence that his father not testify. Brown may even
invite or encourage counsel to speak to his father directly. Counsel
should take advantage of any opportunity to meet personally with the
father to discuss the matter.
On the other hand, Brown may tell counsel that, based on his
discussions with his father, Brown is not able or willing to take the
subject up again with his father. Nor may Brown want counsel to speak
with his father. Should defense counsel, nevertheless, go to see the
client's father and seek to persuade him to testify on his son's behalf?
Should a lawyer do so without first obtaining Brown's permission?
Given counsel's belief that the father's testimony is critical to the
outcome of the trial, she undoubtedly should make every effort to speak
directly with the father before determining how to resolve the disputed
decision. Personal contact with the father gives counsel more
information on which to base ajudgment as to how to proceed. Seeing
a wheezing old man in obvious pain may convince defense counsel that
Brown's preferred strategic choice indeed is appropriate. Alternatively,
counsel may discover that the father's desire not to testify is primarily
related to the bother and the inconvenience of another trip to the
courthouse. In that case, good lawyering demands that counsel use
whatever powers of persuasion she can muster to convince the father to
testify.
Defense counsel's problem, unfortunately, is that she is in a much
better position to decide how to resolve their impasse only after she
actually has talked with the father. Recognizing this, a lawyer may be
sorely tempted to go see the father without requesting the client's
permission. If instead counsel specifically asks Brown's permission but
Brown refuses, then counsel must decide whether to risk irreparably
218. Drawing upon studies involving lawyers and other counselors, CochranJr., DiPippa, and Peters
reached a similar conclusion. COCHRAN,JR., ET AL., supra note 19, at 114-17.
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damaging her relationship with her Client by going to see the father over
Brown's objection.
A lawyer does not have any duty to secure a client's consent before
talking with defense witnesses. Defense counsel is obligated, however,
to conduct a thorough investigation and to prepare properly for trial.
Adequate preparation generally encompasses a responsibility on
counsel's part to interview all relevant witnesses. 22' Because of the
obvious importance of the father's testimony, it may be incumbent on
counsel to ascertain for herself if the client's father is, in fact, unwilling
to testify and the basis for that stance. Arguably, then, counsel has a
duty to go speak to the father regardless of her client's wishes.
I disagree. If Brown insists that his father not be contacted, counsel
has the discretion to decide whether to respect the client's wishes.22'
Unquestionably, counsel should not simply honor her client's wish, but
should attempt vigorously to persuade Brown to reconsider and allow
counsel to speak to Brown's father. If counsel is unsuccessful, however,
she faces another tough call.
This is not to say that counsel necessarily must request or secure
Brown's consent before talking to his father.222 Rather, defense counsel's
prior dealings with the father and son nay have been such that it is
totally appropriate for counsel to contact the father without seeking the
client's consent. Moreover, any ambiguity in the discussion between
219. See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINALJUSTICE Standard 4-4.1 (3d ed. 1993) ("[C]ounsel should
conduct a prompt investigation.... The duty to investigate exists regardless of the accused's admissions
or statements to defense counsel of facts constituting guilt or the accused's stated desire to plead guilty.").
The defendant's initial insistence on pursuing a particular defense also does not diminish counsel's duty to
undertake a thorough investigation. See People v. Ledesma, 729 P.2d 839, 871 (Cal. 1987) (en banc).
220. Although a defendant's insistence that certain witnesses not be called may limit the scope of
counsel's duty of investigation, a client's directives do not excuse counsel's failure to conduct an adequate
investigation. See, e.g., Thompson v. Wainwright, 787 F.2d 1447, 1451-52 (11 th Cir. 1986). But see Knight
v. Dugger, 863 F.2d 705, 706 (11 th Cir. 1988) (finding that defense counsel who followed defendant's
instructions and failed to interview and to present defendant's motherdid not render ineffective assistance).
221. Under the circumstances of this case, counsel would not be deemed ineffective if he respected
Brown's wishes. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 886, 889-90 (11 th Cir. 1985) (holding counsel not
ineffective for failing to investigate and to present mitigatingevidence due to defendant's directives); Alvord
v. Wainwright, 725 F.2d 1282, 1288-89 (1 1th Cir. 1984) (concluding counsel not ineffective because
defendant refused to permit counsel to assert an insanity defense); State v. Thomas, 625 S.W.2d 115, 123-
24 (Mo. 1981) (counsel acted properly in acceding to client's strategic demands regarding presentation of
the defense case even though attorney felt defendant's strategy was unsound); State v. Buchanan, 410
S.E.2d 832, 835 (N.C. 1991) (holding that a defendant cannot complain because counsel acquiesced to
defendant's wishes not to remove certain jurors that counsel deemed unsuitable). Conversely, counsel
surely could point to Standard 4-4.1 tojustify his decision to contact Brown's father. See supra note 219.
222. Indeed, 95.1% of the respondents in the public defender survey on decisionmaking indicated
a willingness to override the client's wishes about interviewing a prospective witness if counsel and client
disagreed about such a decision. See Uphoff& Wood, supra note 31, at 50-51.
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counsel and client about the father or any opening that presents counsel
the opportunity to speak directly to the father should be exploited.Rarely, however, would Brown and'his lawyer have had an extended
conversation about the father's testimony-one in which counsel tried
to persuade Brown to permit her to call the father as a witness-without
counsel expressing a desire to speak with the father directly. It is very
likely, therefore, that Brown took a definite position regarding counsel's
contact with his father. If Brown's initial position is that his father not
be contacted, then, counsel generally should not attempt to contact the
father without first advising Brown of her intentions.
Once having raised the contact issue with Brown, counsel should use
her advocacy skills and her positive relationship with Brown to
overcome Brown's reluctance and to persuade him that she should be
permitted to speak directly with the father about the problem. In
attempting to persuade Brown to allow counsel to contact his father,
counsel should push her client fairly but forcefully.223 It is fair to insist
that counsel's professional obligations include the duty to speak directly
with key witnesses. It also is fair for a lawyer to point out that he or she
may be sanctioned or disciplined if the defense of the case is not handled
properly. Further it is fair-and often effective-to remind the client
how hard counsel has fought for the client and how eager counsel is to
secure justice for the client. Refusing counsel's reasonable request to
meet with the father, counsel may argue, may serve to compromise
counsel's efforts and jeopardize the entire defense.
Nonetheless, despite counsel's best efforts, Brown may remain
steadfastly opposed to counsel talking with his father. Assume, for
example, that Brown informs counsel that his father was totally
exhausted after the last trial and asked his son not to make him go
through a second trial. The son assured his father that his testimony
would not be needed. The son not only is unwilling to ask his father to
testify, but also instructs counsel not even to contact him. Despite
counsel's counseling efforts, Brown refuses to budge. Counsel must now
decide whether to ignore her client's wishes and to contact the father
regardless of the likely damage to the attorney-client relationship.
A review of the four factors noted earlier may aid in counsel's
decision. In the case in which I was consulted, for example, Brown was
a veteran with some college education. He was, therefore, a reasonably
intelligent client who seemingly was very capable of making an informed
choice. Moreover, Brown was fully aware that by barring counsel from
speaking with his father, he not only was preventing counsel from
223. See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINALJUSTICE Standard 4-5.2, commentary at 201.
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having any chance of persuading his father to testify, but he also was
virtually ensuring that his father would not testify at trial. In that case,
nevertheless Brown made a conscious, deliberate choice to spare his
father from worrying about testifying even though that choice greatly
decreased Brown's chances to win at trial. Certainly, the defendant's
choice greatly increased his risk of harm-his lawyer would lose the
chance to persuade Brown's father to testify, the father would not testify,
and Brown would be convicted. Yet, the likely consequences of the
client's choice would be relatively minor-a misdemeanor conviction
and a small fine or short jail sentence. Thus, a balancing.of these four
factors in that case lends support to counsel's decision to respect her
client's choice and not contact the father.224
4. Finding a Way to Finesse the Impasse
Frequently, however, defense counsel who confronts the impasse
presented by the Brown case will be able to gain access to the father and
thereby, to improve significantly counsel's chances for finding a means
to break or to finesse the impasse. Seeing and talking to the father
personally enables counsel to evaluate the accuracy of the defendant's
concerns about his father and to weigh the manner and extent to which
the father-son relationship is affecting the client's decisionmaking. In
addition, this discussion affords counsel the opportunity to determine the
potential for resolving the impasse through counsel's direct intervention
with the father. Perhaps the father can be persuaded to go to the son
and volunteer to testify because the father wants what is best for the son.
As experienced lawyers appreciate, a lawyer's advocacy takes many
different forms. Sometimes persuading a reluctant witness to testify may
require all of a lawyer's persuasive skills-and mean the difference
between the client's success and failure at trial.225
In some instances, counsel's discussion with the father together with
her continuing dialogue with her client will alert counsel to a new
avenue for resolving the dispute. 26 Perhaps, for example, the student
224. As a practical matter, counsel would be hard pressed to persuade a reluctant father to testify if
he was contacting the father in the face of his client's open opposition. Given the facts of this case, I would
not jeopardize my relationship with Brown - and my chances ofchanging his mind later - in an uphill and
likely vain battle to persuade the father to testify over Brown's strenuous objection.
225. Criminal defense lawyers often have to contend with family members, friends, or acquaintances
of the defendant who are unwilling for a variety of diffrent reasons, to come to court to testify.
Overcoming that unwillingness is one ofthe keys to counsel's success as an advocate. For a look at difficulty
of overcoming witness reluctance from the prosecutor's perspective, see Stacy Caplow, Mhat iThere isNo
Client?: Prosecutors as "Counselors" of Crime Viens, 5 CUNICAL L. REv. 1 (1998).
226. In some cases, counsel may even uncover additional corroborating evidence or a new witness
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could reduce the father's stress and, in turn, satisfy her client's concerns
by shortening the length of the father's testimony. Alternatively, counsel
might propose re-structuring the order of defense witnesses in a manner
that permits the father to avoid needless time spent waiting in court
which, once again, night minimize the father's anxiety. By carefully
considering the underlying reasons for the Browns' concerns, a creative
lawyer may be able to fashion a solution that assuages those concerns
and effectively eliminates the impasse.
B. Employing the Anaysis: Three Scenarios
Let us now assume that, despite counsel's best efforts, including
speaking with the client's father, counsel cannot finesse or break the
impasse. In counsel's professional judgment, Brown's father, albeit
reluctant, should be called as a witness because without him Brown's
conviction is almost assured. Brown is adamant, however, that his
father not be called. Thus, counsel must decide whether to respect
Brown's wishes or to call the father as a witness despite Brown's
objections. Counsel cannot avoid the dilemma-she must make a tough
judgment call.
As already discussed, lawyers tend to have a decisionmaking style or
orientation that reflects their view of the proper role of counsel and of
the working of a lawyer-client relationship.227 Invariably, the judgment
call that the defense lawyer faces in the Brown case will be shaped by
her decisionmaking orientation. Yet, as a look at the following three
variations of the Brown case highlights, defense counsel's decision in
each scenario ultimately turns on the importance that she places on the
value of individual autonomy.
1. The Reasoned Objector
In this variation of the case, suppose that after an extended discussion
of the subject of the father's testimony, Brown calmly tells defense
counsel that his preference remains unchanged. That is, he knows that
his father's testimony is very important and that if he goes to trial
without that testimony, he is very likely to lose. Moreover, he under-
stands, he says, that his decision not only is likely to lead to a criminal
thereby minimizing the need for the father's testimony. In the Brown case, however, defense counsel had
already conducted a thorough investigation and knew that Brown's father was the only citizen witness to
the incident.
227. See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text.
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conviction, but also to a fine and possible jail sentence. Brown insists,
however, that his elderly father was very anxious and upset after the,
stress of testifying at the first trial. The father did not eat or sleep for
several weeks following the trial. Although ready to testify if needed, the
father has told the son he dreads the prospect. Brown is willing,
therefore, to forego his father's testimony and suffer the. likely conse-
quences in order to spare his father the ordeal of testifying a second
time. Is it proper for a criminal practitioner in this situation to ignore
Brown's wishes and call the father to testify?
The answer, in my view, is an emphatic no. The prime justification
for taking a traditional, lawyer-centered approach is that the lawyer, as
trained expert, is better able to decide strategic matters.228 A traditional-
ist may argue that the lawyer has the right to make the strategic decision
to call the father because that choice clearly increases the likelihood of
the defendant's success at trial. This approach trumps the value of client
autonomy, but does so in order to maximize the client's own good.
That is, this approach assumes that winning at trial and avoiding a
criminal conviction ultimately serves the client's best interests even if the
client does not recognize or appreciate the wisdom of counsel's
choice.229
In this scenario, however, the dispute between counsel and her client
is not really about strategy-how to attain a good result-but whether
the cost of success at trial is worth the price. The dispute actually
involves a conflict ofvalues. Although counsel may believe that winning
at trial is so important that it outweighs the relatively minor harm that
the father will experience by testifying, Brown disagrees. Plainly, not
everyone need share counsel's emphasis on winning.23 ° Indeed,
reasonable, rational people often disagree strongly about values and the
weight or the priority to be given certain values. 3'
228. See supra notes 14, 17 and accompanying text.
229. SeeJohn B. Mitchell, Narrative and Client-Centered Representation: What is a True Believer to Do When
His Two Favorite Theories Collide?, 6 CLINICAL L. REv. 85, 98 (1999) (describing how earlier in his practice.
he adhered to a traditional approach assuming that the clients wanted to win and how incensed he would
be when his clients would "screw up my case"). But see Luban, supra note 16, at 466-79 (discussing
ambiguity of paternalist claim to be acting in the best interest of another).
230. Many in society are unwilling to engage in certain behavior or employ particular means even
though such action may increase one's chances for success or further the advancement of a legitimate end.
In the sports world, for example, people sharply divide over issues of sportsmanship and of the merits of
a win-at-all-costs mentality. On the importance of looking beyond just winning and treating the client as
a friend, see SHAFFER & COCHRAN,JR., supra note 11, at 40-54.
231. People disagree even over what constitutes a value. For example, some view chastity before
marriage as an important value worth upholding, but many do not. For a helpful discussion of the
difference between values and wants, see Luban, supra note 16 at 467-79.
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Furthermore, even though defense counsel may view the father's
discomfort as relatively minor, Brown does not. To Brown, his father's
stress and attendant well being is quite significant. 2 In fact, it is so
significant that Brown is willing to asstime a markedly greater risk at
trial and the ensuing personal harm in order to avoid causing any harm
to his father. His choice is not irrational, but represents a reasoned
expression of Brown's values and priorities. Why then should Brown's
ordering of values be accorded less weight than counsel's?
Quite simply, it should not be. In this scenario, for instance, counsel's
focus and her perception of Brown's best interest may have been too
narrow. Lawyers have no special expertise in defining how others
should prioritize their values.233 The lawyer's role as case manager does
not give counsel the power to substitute counsel's value scheme for the
client's or to force a client to accept counsel's win-at-all-costs mentality.
Rather, it is the client who has the right to make value choices in the
process of setting the objectives of the case.2" 4 If the client makes a
conscious, informed choice to lessen his chances at trial in order to
promote another objective-the well-being of his father--that the
defendant deems more important, then that choice should be
respected. 5
A consideration of the four factors previously identified supports the
conclusion that, given the facts of this scenario, counsel should respect
the client's choice. Despite rejecting counsel's recommended strategy,
the client in this scenario clearly displayed the ability to process the
information presented him. Cognizant of the risks involved, Brown
made a reasoned, meaningful choice. Brown understood that his choice
was very likely to lead to negative consequences for him. He also was
fully aware of the harm he was likely to suffer as a result-a guilty
verdict, criminal conviction, a fine or minimal jail sentence. Brown's
choice unmistakably reflected his balancing of the harm he would suffer
compared with the suffering his father would endure if compelled to
testify again. Although others-including counsel-may disagree with
that choice, Brown's decision and the process he used to arrive at the
232. In my experience, lawyers often fail to recognize how frightening or traumatic testifying at trial
is for many people.
233. See SHAI'FER & COCHRAN,JR., supra note 11, at 30-61,94-129 (rejecting the notion of lawyers'
moral superiority and arguing instead that lawyers have responsibility to counsel clients to make moral
judgments but to do so without imposing the lawyer's own values). But see William Simon, Ethical Discretion
in L,,yering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083 (1988); WILLIAM SIMON, THE PRACTICE OFJUSTICE (1998).
234. See MODEL RULES OF PROFE SSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2 (1989); supra note 53.
235. See Luban, supra note 16, at 473-74 (concluding that "if an individual adduces reasons for acting
in non-self-interested ways, paternalism is unjustifiable - it is an assault on the individual's integrity").
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decision, undeniably, were reasonable. Accordingly, counsel should
respect Brown's wishes.
Respecting a client's choice, however, does mean simply accepting
the client's definition of what constitutes his or her best interest. Once
again, good lawyering often requires that counsel push the client to
weigh different considerations and interests.236  Forcing a criminal
defendant to take a hard look at the future and the likely long term
effects of various decisions is at the heart of good client counseling.
Given the facts in this scenario, however, counsel's judgment call is
not especially difficult. A calm, reasonable client concerned about his
elderly father is choosing to suffer some harm to spare his father some
pain. Defense counsel may not relish the task of going to trial without
a key weapon. It often is hard for a trial lawyer to accept losing a trial,
especially if counsel cannot put forward her best defense. Nevertheless,
given the minimal harm Brown faces, the defendant's choice is
reasonable, perhaps even noble. In this case, therefore, counsel should
find it relatively easy to respect her client's choice. Changing the facts,
however, may make counsel's call much tougher and lead to a very
different result.
2. The Irrational Objector
Let us examine a second variation of the Brown case. In this
scenario, Brown and his lawyer again have discussed at length the issue
of the father's testimony and have reached an impasse. The reason
Brown does not want his father called to the witness stand, however, has
nothing to do with concerns about the father's health. In fact, the father
is eager to testify. Rather, Brown's insistence that the father not be
called is based on Brown's assessment of his father's performance at the
last trial. Brown is convinced, despite counsel's vigorous arguments to
the contrary, that his father was a terrible witness who unwittingly
undermined Brown's whole defense. Ignoring the jurors' post-trial
comments and counsel's best judgment, Brown firmly believes he is
likely to win at trial if he just keeps his father off the witness stand.
In this scenario, defense counsel is wrestling with an impasse that
routinely confronts the criminal practitioner. It is quite common for
lawyers and criminal defendants to discuss a proposed witness and
disagree sharply about the strengths or weaknesses of that person's
testimony. Sometimes counsel and a client quarrel about the relative
weight a trier of fact will give to certain testimony and at other times, the
236. See MODELRULEs OFPROFESSIONALCONDUcTRue 2.1 cmt. (1989); supra notes 53 and 216.
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dispute centers on how the judge or jury will react to the bearing or
demeanor of a prospective witness. As this scenario highlights, the
lawyer and the defendant may have radically different perspectives of
how a witness or certain evidence will cut or play when presented to a
jury.
The dispute in this variation of the Brown case, thus, turns on two
conflicting perceptions of the consequences of a strategic choice. From
Brown's standpoint, the choice is obvious. His father is a very poor
witness whose testimony at the last trial badly hurt the defense. Keeping
his father off the witness stand, therefore, greatly improves his chances
of winning the upcoming trial.
Although Brown has listened to defense counsel's arguments about
the importance of his father's testimony, his view is that counsel simply
is mistaken. Brown's perceptions, moreover, are unlikely to change,
despite counsel's efforts, because they are based on Brown's own first
hand observations. For Brown and many other clients, assessing
witnesses turns on the ability to read people and to accurately gauge
how others will react to a person. Brown may firmly believe that he has
as much-or, perhaps, even more-experience and insight about such
matters as counsel, especially if defense counsel is a young lawyer or a
law student. 37 From Brown's perspective, then, calling his father as a
witness is a counterproductive, foolish tactical step.
Defense counsel's perspective, however, is markedly different.
Assessing witnesses and analyzing evidence are exactly the types of tasks
that lawyers, as skilled professionals, are trained to perform. This
professional training gives lawyers a proper focus enabling them to judge
the value of certain evidence and its relevance to the overall case. In
addition, a lawyer's judgment is honed by experience238 and enhanced
by counsel's disinterested, objective perspective.
In defense counsel's professional judgment, the strategic choice called
for in this scenerio is clear. Brown's father is a very credible witness who
evokes sympathy and support for the defense. Yet, almost inconceivably
237. Young, inexperienced lawyers, especially public defenders, often are challenged by clients who
underestimate counsel and overestimate their own abilities and experience. Yet, some client's have
experiences and insights that may greatly benefit the defense. For an article extolling the merits of listening
to a client's insights, see Miller, supra note 19.
238. In the cas& of a law student practicing pursuant to a student practice rule, the student must rely
heavily on the supervising attorney's professional experience. A client normally would be made aware of
the supervisor's background and professional opinion in the course of discussing a disagreement about a
strategic decision. How far the supervisor would or should go in the counseling process to influence the
ultimate decision turns on the nature of the supervisor/student relationship, and their resolution of the
intervention issue, and the circumstances of that decision. For a thorough, insightful discussion of the
intervention issue, see Chavkin, supra note 4, at 1527-45.
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to counsel, Brown sees his father as a damaging witness. Brown is
unwilling or unable to recognize the value of his father's testimony
largely because Brown's judgment is clouded by his defensive, warped
perception of his own testimony and credibility. Brown's proposed
strategy, therefore, is flawed because it ultimately rests on his distorted
assessment of his father's worth as a witness.
This is more than just a minor disagreement between counsel and
client over the merits of calling a particular witness. Admittedly, even
skilled professionals at times assess the same witness differently. Simply
because a client sees evidence or a witness in a different light does not
mean that the client is misguided or irrational. Moreover, this is not.
merely a case of conflicting risk calculations or of differing attitudes
about risk taking.239 Assessing risk and figuring the impact of a
particular witness on one's overall risk calculations necessarily are
difficult and inexact tasks that often produce reasonable, albeit heated,
disagreements. 2
40
In counsel's view, however, this is not a reasonable, rational disagree-
ment. Rather, this is a case in which counsel and the client fundamen-
tally disagree about the client's perceptions of reality.21  Furthermore,
counsel is absolutely confident that Brown's erroneous, illogical view of
239. A lawyer and client might agree, for instance, that a particular witness was ineffective on a prior
occasion, but disagrees about that witness' likely performance or potential worth in a second proceeding.
Or, even if the defendant concurs that the chances of an improved performance or of a different jury
reaction is small, the defendant may be willing to take the gamble, despite the slim chances for success,
because in view of all of the other evidence, the gamble makes sense. Defense counsel, on the other hand,
might see other defense witnesses as strong or the state's witnesses as weaker and worry that a poor
performance by the witness in question will drag down the entire defense case. Thus, counsel may urge a
different strategy with respect to that witness.
240. For an extended -look at the difficult task of assessing witnesses, see GARY BELLOW & BEA
MOULTON, THE LAWYERING PROCESS: PREPARING AND PRESENTING THE CASE 227-50 (1981). For a
discussion .of the complex task of making meaningful predictions, see KREIGER, ET AL., sspra note 202, at
197-203.
241. At times, clients have more insight into the power of their own stories than counsel. See, e.g.,
Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetnical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing ofMrs. G., 38 BuFF.
L. REv. 1(1990). In other instances, clients want to tell their own story - their way - regardless of the effect
the client's strategy has on the client's winning the case. See Clark D. Cunningham, A Tale of Two Clients:
ThinkingAbout Law as Language, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2459 (1989). Nevertheless, there also are "troublesome"
cases in which:
the client wants to tell the story, can fully express his/her voice to the jury, can provide the
jury with the concrete details of his/her world that provide the necessary context for
evaluating that story, and the story is arguably true, but the fact finder will nevertheless
automatically discount the story because the story is not plausible within the narrative
structures available to the fact finder.
Mitchell, supra note 229, at 103. Although I agree with Mitchell that there are some troublesome client
stories that can be creatively harmonized as described in his article, in other cases, allowing the client to
tell her story her way will ensure that her story is not effectively presented. In Brown's case, counsel is
confident that presenting Brown's case his way will ensure that his story is summarily rejected by thejury.
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his father is driving his client's proposed strategy. Defense counsel is
also firmly convinced that her own observations and assessment of the
father's demeanor and of the value of his testimony are correct. Finally,
the validity of counsel'sjudgment and the wisdom of her strategic choice
have been confirmed by the original jurors.
. Unquestionably, Brown and his lawyer have a common goal in this
scenario-winning the trial. Nonetheless, Brown's means to that
end-keeping his father off the witness stand-are, in counsel's view,
wholly inconsistent with that desired end. Blinded by faulty judgment,
Brown is insisting on pursuing a course of action that actually increases
the likelihood of a guilty verdict. Thus, from counsel's perspective,
deferring to the client's desired strategy seems irrational and unwise
because it serves to frustrate, not promote, the client's own goals.242
To many lawyers and commentators, good lawyering often demands
that lawyers first identify and then correct the faulty irrational thinking
of their clients.243 Frequently good lawyers must persuade their clients
of the folly of certain actions or decisions. Such counseling is at the
heart of good lawyering regardless of one's lawyering style or
decisionmaking orientation. Lawyers differ, however, in the techniques
they will employ and the extent to which they will go to dissuade their
clients from taking foolish, harmful action. In the end, the difference
turns primarily on the individual lawyer's willingness to allow a client
the right to be wrong.
For most lawyers-certainly those espousing a traditional lawyer-
centered view-allowing Brown to make an unsound tactical decision
runs contrary to counsel's professional training. Indeed, permitting a
criminal defendant to pursue a strategy that is hurtful to his or her case
runs contrary to the professional's first duty: protect the client.244 As
Justice White observed, defense counsel's mission is, above all, to
advance the interests of the defendant even at the expense of truth or the
242. See Smith, supra note 216, at 28-37 (discussing tension between client autonomy and lawyer
responsibility and concluding that at times lawyers must take decisionmaking responsibility); Ross, supra
note 201, at 1372-86 (arguing that defense counsel should override wishes of mentally ill defendants to
promote that client's best interests). But see Luban, sulfra note 16, at 466-79 (noting the problem of labeling
odd preferences as irnational and of distinguishing acceptable from unacceptable bad reasoning).
243. See, e.g., Simon, supra note 22, at 222-26.
244. In rejecting the claim that criminal defense lawyers should temper their zealous representation
based on a duty to others, including the community as a whole, Abbe Smith unabashedly embraces the zeal
and the undiluted partisanship demanded of the criminal defense lawyer by the ethics codes. See Abbe
Smith, Commentary - Burdening the Least of Us: "Race-Conscious"Ethics in Crininal Defense, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1585,
1589 (1999). "For it is passion - unbridled, undistilled, and intensely focused passion on behalf of a person
in need -that drives criminal defense lawyers to use 'all means and expedients ... at all hazards and costs
to other persons' to 'save th[e] client."' Id. at 1599-1600 (citation omitted).
814
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interests of the state.245  Deferring to a client's irrational strategy
seemingly violates counsel's solemn duty to fight zealously on a defen-
dant's behalf. For many lawyers, such deference is equivalent to counsel
agreeing to "throw" the contest.246
Anecdotal 247 and empirical evidence 248 indicate that many criminal
lawyers see themselves, in fact, as their client's champions and adhere
to a "heroic" image of the role of the criminal defense lawyer. 249 Such
lawyers are motivated by a desire to challenge the State and best the
prosecutor. Driven by the desire to battle the State, to protect the client
and, above all, to win, lawyers with this heroic, traditional view
generally would find it very difficult to permit Brown to make a "wrong"
strategic decision. 50 Facing the impasse presented by this variation of
the Brown case, such lawyers would adopt a lawyer-centered approach
and be inclined to manipulate, threaten, or even coerce Brown, if
necessary, to ensure that he not be injured by his own foolishness. If
Brown remained insistent that his father not be called to testify, the
traditional approach ultimately dictates that counsel disregard Brown's
wishes.
Understandably, a criminal practitioner may be sorely tempted to
take such a lawyer-centered approach and save Brown from his own
foolishness. The role of savior can be quite appealing. Playing savior,
however, demands a clarity of vision and purpose that few lawyers
possess. Thus, before rushing to embrace this role, a criminal defense
lawyer should examine carefully her justifications for overriding her
client's preferred strategy.
As in the first scenario, counsel's focus or perspective may be too
narrow. In the process of making strategic decisions for the client's own
good, counsel may be using a system for filtering information that is as
distorted or as biased as the client's. In the guise of correcting irrational
strategic thinking, counsel may be treating any choice inconsistent with
her own as irrational. Once again, the line between ends and means is
245. See U.S. v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218,257-58 (1967) (White,J., dissenting in part, concurring in part);
Smith v. State, 717 P.2d 402 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986). For extended discussions of the criminal defense
lawyer's duty ofzealous advocacy and ofthe different role of the criminal defense lawyer, see David Luban,
Are CGiminal Defenders Different?, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1729, 1762 (1993); FREEDMAN, supra note 9, at 65-86;
Barbara Allen Babcock, Defending the Guilty, 32 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 175, 177-78 (1983).
246. See Babcock, supra note 245, at 178 (describing her passionate desire to win as one of the
motivating factors that drives her to fight for her criminal clients).
247. See Smith & Montross, supra note 199, at 515-35; Abbe Smith, "Nice Work If#'ou Can Get It:"
"Ethical"Juty Selection In Criminal Defense, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 523, 564 (1998).
248. See MANN, supra note 199.
249. See Ogletree, supra note 35, at 1275-8 1.
250. Seeid. at 1281.
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often blurred such that the imposition of counsel's strategic choice
actually may reflect a difference of opinion over values.25'
Second, lawyers are neither disinterested observers nor pure hearted
saints striving selflessly to serve their client's best interests. Rather, the
vast majority are people of normal desires and motivations pushed and
pulled by a host of competing interests as they struggle to provide their
clients competent representation. Financial concerns, loyalty to others,
demanding caseloads, and the need to allocate scarce resources,
including counsel's time, may compromise a criminal defense lawyer's
decisionmaking.252 Despite such pressures, many criminal defense
lawyers render effective, conscientious representation.253 But not all do.
Sadly, some lawyers allow their professional judgment to be adversely
affected by interests other than the defendant's best interest.254
Third, lawyers generally are interested in their standing or reputation
in the community. A criminal defense lawyer particularly may be
concerned about her reputation among judges, peers, and prosecu-
tors. '55 So too, even the most conscientious lawyer appreciates that her
desire to perform her craft well and to have others think highly of her
work may influence her strategic decisionmaking in a criminal case. As
Justice Brennan warned, "[g] ood lawyers undoubtedly recognize these
temptations and resist them, and they endeavor to convince their clients
that they will. It would be naive, however, to suggest that they always
succeed in either task." '256
Finally, the traditionalist's claim to an unbridled right to make all
strategic choices about witnesses is based largely on the superiority of
the lawyer's professional judgments. Yet, lawyers' judgments about
witnesses involve much more art than science. Such judgments or
assessments are not statistically grounded, but represent only counsel's
best estimate of how a witness will perform and how a trier of fact will
251. See Luban, supra note 16, at 466-67.
252. See Uphoff, supra note 216, at 77-81; Smith & Montross, supra note 199, at 532-33.
253. See RodneyJ. Uphoff, The Criminal Defense Lawyer: Zealous Advocate, Double Agent, or Beleaguered
Dealer?, 28 CRIM. L. BULL.. 419, 427-28 (1992).
254. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 216, at 1179-1270; Uphoff, supra note 253, at 425-47;
Commonwealth v. Martinez, 681 N.E. 2d 818,823-27 (Mass. 19,97) (defense counsel's divided loyalties and
breach ofelient's confidence established conflict ofinterest warranting new trial). Criminal defendants face
an uphill battle, especially when the conflict of interest does not involve multiple representation, in
demonstrating that defense counsel's conflict actually adversely affected counsel's performance. See, e.g.,
Beets v. Scott, 65 F.3d 1258, 1260 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (finding that defendant failed to show that
counsel's unethical media contract and his failure to withdraw as counsel to testify as a defense witness
actually prejudiced her case).
255. See Ted Schneyer, Some Sympathy for the Hired Gun, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 11, 23-25 (1991);
Alschuler, supra note 216, at 1254-55. For a more detailed look at the pressures criminal defense lawyers
face to "play ball" rather than to be adversarial, see Uphoff, supra note 216, at 89-94.
256. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 761-62 (1983) (Brennan,J., dissenting).
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react to that witness. Often these estimates are little more than educated
hunches, much like weather forecasting before the age of modern
technology. Such assessments are hardly infallible. Indeed, lawyers
with limited trial experience-especially young lawyers who also have
limited life experience-may be only marginally more capable of
making sound strategic decisions about witnesses than their clients.
In light of the inevitable uncertainty of many tactical moves and the
varied, conflicting interests that. may cloud counsel's judgment, not all
lawyers can be trusted to use their tactical decisionmaking power wisely
or consistent with their clients' best interest. Indeed, for the client-
centered lawyer-aware of the fallibility of her judgment calls and
suspicious of the traditional lawyer's claim of undivided selfless, zeal-it
is the defendant who is more likely to make strategic decisions that are
consistent with the client's own interests.257 Lawyers who disregard or
override their clients' strategic choices, ostensibly in order to serve their
clients, mayjust be abusing their power. If the defendant's choice seems
foolish, so be it. A defendant should be free to reject counsel's proffered
advice because it is, after all, the client's case.
Cognizant of the conflicts inherent in the traditional approach, the
novice criminal practitioner may be more inclined to take a client-
centered approach and to defer to Brown's strategy. Certainly for some
advocates, the client-centered approach has considerable appeal
because it maximizes the client's autonomy. For other lawyers,
however, the approach is attractive because deferring to the clients'
strategic wishes allows them to escape the burden of decisionmaking
responsibility.258 Nervous or insecure about their own tactical acumen,
some lawyers attempt to duck responsibility by too readily agreeing to
a client's foolhardy strategic choice.259 Perhaps wary of assuming full
responsibility for making the right strategic call, the novice defense
lawyer may find it more comfortable simply to give in to the client's
desired strategy.
Good criminal defense lawyers do not attempt to shirk their responsi-
bility to provide their clients candid advice and counsel.26 Admittedly,
257. See COCHRANJR., ET AL., supra note 19, at 3; ROSENTHAL, supra note 11, at 36-46.
258. See Cathy Kelly, Wat We Could Teach the Cops About Coercion, THE CHAMPION, May 1998 at 34,
62 (arguing that lawyers should stop controlling clients' choices not only because clients should have the
right of self-determination, but it is far less stressful for lawyers if they stop playing god).
259. A lack of time, interest, or experience also may explain a lawyer's willingness to defer to a
defendant's foolish strategic decision. See, e.g., Brennan v. Blankenship, 472 F.Supp. 149, 157 (W.D. Va.
1979), aft'd, 624 F.2d 1093 (1980) (defense counsels failed to develop the only viable defense to the criminal
charge, failed to inform client of the impact of raising such a defense, and allowed themselves to be "guided
by [client's] uninformed direction").
260. For the criminal defense lawyer, candid advice often entails telling the defendant that she has
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many tactical decisions are fraught with uncertainty. At times, counsel
may be very anxious about the wisdom of a particular strategic choice.
Sometimes the best that counsel can do is to advise the defendant that
he or she must chose between two equally risky options. In other
instances, however, counsel may be very confident of the folly of the
client's proposed strategic decision. In such a case, good lawyering
demands that counsel advocate vigorously to dissuade a client from
pursuing that foolish course of action.26" '
Assume, therefore, that Brown's defense lawyer has not tried to wiggle
out of the dilemma she faces, but has confronted it directly. Highly
skilled criminal defense lawyers generally are more capable than their
clients in making sound tactical judgments. Thus, defense counsel in
this variation of the Brown case, an experienced lawyer who also is a
clinical law teacher, may be absolutely correct in her assessment of the
best strategy to employ. Certainly there are times-and this scenario
presents such a case-when the client's proposed tactic or strategy is just
plain foolhardy. By respecting such a misguided tactic, counsel is aiding
the client in harming himself Or, at the very least, counsel has failed to
stop the defendant from imposing a self-inflicted wound. The question
becomes should defense counsel allow the defendant to harm himself?.
It is true, of course, that our society grants people broad freedom to
pursue their own needs, including the right to make what many others
might deem poor or even immoral choices. 2 Our respect for the
individual's freedom of choice is so strong that we give people the right
to engage in conduct or take part in activities that may be harmful or
even life-threatening.263 Criminal defendants, including those facing the
two unpalatable options: pleading guilty and accepting a long sentence or taking a weak case to trial and
risking receiving an even longer sentcnce. For a helpful discussion of the skill of delivering such bad news
to a client, see Linda F. Smith, Medical Paradigs For Counseling: Giving Clients ButNews, 4 CLINICAL L. REV.
391 (1998).
261. See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINALJUSTICE Standard 4-5.2 (3d ed. 1993); supra notes 3, 53, 216,
236 and accompanying text.
262. See Stephen L. Pepper, The Latyer'sAmoral Ethical Ro&: A Defense, A Problem, and Some Possibilities
1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES.J. 613, 616-17 (noting that this societal commitment to the principle of
individual autonomy is "founded on the belief that liberty and autonomy are a moral good, that fiee choice
is better than constraint, that each of us wishes, to the extent possiblc, to make our own choices rather than
to have them made for us").
263. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261,287-89 (1990) (O'Connor,
J., concurring) ("[O]ur notions ofliberty arc inextricably entwined with our idea of physical freedom and
self-determination.... Requiring a competent adult to endure such procedures against her will burdens
the patient's liberty, dignity, and freedom to determine the course of her own treatment. Accordingly, the
liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause must protect, if it protects anything, an individual's deeply
personal decision to reject medical treatment, including the artificial delivery of food and water."); Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 179, 210-15 (1973) (Douglas,J, concurring) (detailing the many rights contained within
the sweep of"the Blessings of Liberty" among them " the autonomous control over the development and
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death penalty, are permitted to make decisions or take actions that are
harmful and seemingly contrary to their best interests.264 Why then
should represented defendants be denied their freedom of choice over
important strategic matters simply because, at the outset of the case,
they accepted the assistance of counsel?
In my view, there is no principled reason for depriving defendants of
their freedom to make important strategic decisions. The traditional
justification for limiting the defendant's freedom is that society's interest
in a just, accurate result compels the defendant to accept the' sound
decisions of his professional representative.265 Yet we allow clients to
represent themselves despite the real danger such self-representation will
skew the trial's outcome and permit the conviction of an innocent
defendant.266 Surely represented defendants, even those who insist on
a foolish tactic, generally are exposed to less risk of a flawed conviction
than those defendants who go to trial without counsel. If respect for
individual autonomy justifies self-representation, then that same
principle supports greater client control over strategic decisionmaking. 267
It is not, in fact, concerns about innocence and accurate results that
fuel judicial and professional reluctance to grant defendants greater say
over tactical and strategic decisionmaking. Rather, it is concerns about
finality, about efficiency, and about the orderly administration ofjustice
that explain the bench and the bar's unwillingness to harness profes-
sional power and their willingness to restrict client decisionmaking.268
expression of one's intellect, interests, tastes, and personality" and the right of privacy which includes "the
privilege of an individual to plan his own affairs, for, outside areas of plainly harmful conduct, every
American is left to shape his own life as he thinks best, do what he pleases, go where he pleases").
264. See, e.g., Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1974) (defendant permitted to represent oneselfeven
though such self-representation may be hurtful to one's own defense); People v. Bloom, 774 P.2d 698, 713-
15 (Cal. 1989) (en banc) (defendant in capital case has right to instruct counsel not to present mitigating
evidence).
265. See U.S. v. Teague, 953 F,2d 1525, 1536 (11th Cir. 1992) (en bane) (Edmondson, Jr., J.,
concurring).
266. See Farelta, 422 U.S at 833-34 (defendant's right ofself-representation constitutionally protected
notwithstanding the danger that such representation may undermine the fairness of the trial).
267. Citing Faretta, the Missouri Supreme Court upheld the defendant's right to block his attorney's
chosen defense and insist on his own defense strategy. State v. Thomas, 625 S.W.2d 115, 124 (Mo. 1981).
The court stated that the defendant:
[m]ay not be forced to accept major decisions of trial strategy if he is fully informed and
voluntarily decides not to follow the advice of his lawyer. It would be absurd to say that a
defendant may waive the assistance ofcounsel entirely and yet may not waive the benefit
ofcounsel's advice with respect to a particular decision, such as whether or not to assert a
particular defense.
Id.
268. See LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 7, at 559-62. These concerns often are coupled in federal
decisions with a stated desire to respect state sovereignty. See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722
(1991).
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Lawyers strapped for time do not want to take the time to explain or to
justify their strategic maneuvers. Critics of client-centered
decisionmaking not only claim that such an approach is too time
consuming, but that it is also ultimately futile to expect most defendants
to be able to understand strategic considerations such that they, in turn,
can make informed tactical decisions. 2 9  Additionally, judges and
lawyers raise the specter of the meddlesome defendant continuously
changing his mind or constantly interrupting counsel's strategic flow
making it impossible to present a coherent, effective defense °.2 " The
meddlesome defendant not only may damage his own case, but also
may damage counsel's professional reputation. 271  Both judges and
lawyers also worry that decisionmaking disputes will spill over and
disrupt court proceedings. Above all, bench and bar are wary of doing
anything more to fan the flames of the ineffective assistance of counsel
claims that already swamp the appellate courts.
In the end, none of these concerns justify depriving an informed,
competent defendant of the right to make important strategic choices.
Courts are quite willing to trumpet the defendant's decisionmaking
power when affirming a conviction in which counsel and/or the trial
court acceded to the defendant's requested strategic wishes.272 This is
so even if the defendant's strategy is foolish or suicidal.273 On the other
hand, courts routinely refuse to closely scrutinize or rubberstamp
counsel's dubious strategic moves, even though taken without consulting
with or in direct contravention of the defendant's wishes, ostensibly
because counsel needs such decisional control to be effective.274
Defendants who are sufficiently persistent or disruptive-or whose
counsel, for whatever reason, agrees to abide by the client's
wishes-may well be given control over a strategic decision. Many
other defendants, however, will not have any say over tactical
decisionmaking and only a limited right to complain about counsel's
poor strategic decisions under the Strickland standard. Thus, the
prevailing judicial attitude toward client involvement in strategic
decisionmaking is like that toward jury nullification. Although courts
269. See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAIJUSTICE Standard 4-5.2, commentary at 202.
270. See LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supr note 7, at 562.
271. Id.
272. See, e.g., Trimble v. State, 693 S.W.2d 267, 278-79 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985); Commonwealth v.
Sam, 635 A.2d 603,611-12 (Pa. 1993).
273. See, e.g., People v. Bloom, 774 P.2d 698, 713-30 (Cal. 1989) (in banc); State v. Thomas, 625
S.W.2d 115, 123-24 (Mo. 1981).
274. See, e.g., Timble, 693 S.W.2d at 279 (acknowledging that "the lawyer's choice made contrary to
the client's wishes will also be approved even where the wisdom, in hindsight, may be dubious, on the
ground that counsel has control of the decisional process and must have such control to be effective").
820
HeinOnline  -- 68 U. Cin. L. Rev. 820 1999-2000
2000] RESPECTING A DEFEADANT'S TACTICAL CHOICES 821
generally acknowledge that a jury has the right to nullify the law by its
verdict, judges are loathe to inform jurors of the existence of that right
for fear it will be exercised too freely.275  Similarly, judges fear the
disruptive effects of greater client control over strategic decisionmaking.
Professional concerns and judicial fears, however, are overstated.
Greater client involvement in decisionmaking demands improved
lawyer-client communication. In some cases, lawyer and client will
need to spend more time together outside of court. Undoubtedly, some
defendants will find it difficult to understand the-information needed to
make sound, informed strategic decisions. In my experience, however,
most of the confused or inexperienced clients gladly will defer to
counsel's recommended strategy.276 In fact, many criminal defendants,
including sophisticated clients, are quite happy to turn over
decisionmaking responsibility to counsel.
On the other hand, a significant number of defendants will want to
play an active role in case decisionmaking. At times, a defendant will not
agree with counsel's proposed tactic. When strategic disagreements
develop, however, counsel may find it difficult to resolve that dispute
amicably. Undoubtedly, some disputes over tactics will necessitate a
court hearing or, at least, the making of a record.277 Yet, giving clients
a great role in strategic decisionmaking does not translate necessarily
into contentious, wasteful court proceedings. Indeed, better lawyer-
client communication may eliminate many disputes and, in the end,
save judicial resources and facilitate smooth judicial proceedings.
Moreover, asking defendants before trial if they have had an opportu-
nity to discuss important strategic decisions with counsel and requiring
courts to resolve decisionmaking disputes before trial instead of on
appeal may improve the overall functioning of the adversary system.
27
More importantly, the fact that some clients may be hurt by their own
indecision or interference with counsel's orderly presentation of the
defense does not justify granting lawyers sweeping authority over all
strategic decisionmaking. Being charged with a crime and requesting
275. See, e.g., State v. Hatori, 990 P.2d 115, 119-22 (Haw. Ct. App. 1999).
276. Most criminal defense lawyers would concur that experienced criminal defendants, especially
those who feel they were betrayed or poorly defended by their previous lawyers, are more likely to challenge
counsel's recommendations. For similar observations, see White, supra note 210, at 338, 347-76.
277. See STANDARDS FOR CRINIINALJUSTICE Standard 4-5.2 (3d ed. 1993) (suggesting that record
be made of any significant disagreement between counsel and the defendant over strategy or tactics).
278. Some state courts already require such a colloquy to ensure that the defendant's right to testify
is fully protected. See, e.g., People v. Curtis, 681 P.2d 504, 514 (Colo. 1984) (en banc); Culberson v. State,
412 So. 2d 1184, 1186-87 (Miss. 1982); State v. Neuman, 371 S.E.2d 77,81-82 (W. Va. 1988). Extending
that colloquy to include other strategic considerations may be both workable and desirable. A full
discussion of this proposal, however, is beyond the scope of this article.
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the aid of a lawyer ought not deprive competent adults of their right to
control the decisions which ultimately affect their lives and their liberty.
Clients should be able to opt to have their lawyers make all strategic
decisions, but the decision to accept appointed counsel hardly represents
a conscientious choice to cede all tactical decisionmaking power to
counsel. Persons presumed innocent should be free to reject counsel's
advice and pursue a foolish or wrong course of action if they so desire.
Indeed, respect for individual autonomy dictates that a defendant like
Brown be permitted to make the strategic choice regarding his father,
even if that strategy ensures the defendant's demise." 9
But here's the rub. Although, in theory, I generally agree that
defendants should have the right to be foolish, I have found in actual
practice, that it is very difficult to honor that right. Like most criminal
defense lawyers, I take seriously my responsibility to zealously defend
my clients. In striving to do my best, I have learned, like Charles
Ogletree,28 that empathy for those accused of crimes has been an
important motivating factor for me and for many of the lawyers with
whom I have worked.28" ' Empathy pushes me to work harder for my
clients and to worry more. I am not only interested in the outcome of
my clients' cases, but in what happens to them after their cases are
concluded. Clients are not just case numbers, but real people with
families and dreams. Sometimes they have become my friends.2"2 In
this I am not unique; many of the criminal defense lawyers that I know
and others with whom I have worked are very empathic.' 3
279. As the Second Circuit observcd, "even in cases wherc the accused is harming himselfby insisting
on conducting his own defense, respect for individual autonomy requires that he be allowed to go to jail
under his own banner ifhe so desires." United Sustes ex rel Malonado v. Denno, 348 F.2d 12, 15 (2nd Cir.
1965). See also RichardJ. Bonnie, TheDignity ofthe Condemned, 74 VA. L. REV. 1363 (1988) (arguing that
respect for individual dignity demands that competent defendants be given control over the decision to
abandon the appeal of a death sentence and to block the presentation ofmitigating evidence in the penalty
phase of a capital trial).
280. See Ogletree, .supra note 35.
281. I worked as a public defender in the Milwaukee office from 1978 to 1984, directed a criminal
defense clinic at the University of Wisconsin Law School from 1984 to 1988, and have run a criminal
defense clinic at the University of Oklahoma College of Law fiom 1990 until the present. For a thorough
discussion of the importance of lawyers' understanding of the emotional aspects of the lawyer-client
relationship, including valuing empathy, see Maijorie A. Silver, Love, H(e, and Other Emotional Interference in
the Lauyer/Client Reltionship, 6 CuN. L. REV. 259 (1999).
282. See SHAFFER & COCHRANJR., supra note 11, at 44-54 (arguing for a moral relationship between
lawyer and client like that between friends); Ogletree, supra note 35, at 1271-75 (describing the nature of
his friendship with his clients and contrasting it with Charles Fried's concept of the friendship between
lawyer and client). For a full exploration of Fried's view, see Charles Fried, 77e Lnyer as Fiend 77 Moral
Foundations of the Lauyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE LJ. 1060 (1976).
283. See Smith, upra note 244, at 1592 (observing that "criminal defense lawyers often have
'authentic, loving' relationships with individual clients" (citing Phyllis Goldfarb, A Clinic Rum Through It, 1
CLIN. L. REV. 65, 86-91 (1994))); Smith & Montross, supra note 199, at 455-58, 497-535 (extolling the
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Empathy also means treating one's clients with dignity and respect.
I have tried to maintain a respectful attitude toward all of my clients,
especially since defendants get so little respect from others in the
criminal justice system.284 So too, empathy for my clients encourages
me to involve my clients in decisionmaking. I have taken to heart
Justice Brennan's charge that "[t]he role of the defense lawyer should be
above all to function as the instrument and defender of the client's
autonomy and dignity in all phases of the criminal process." 28 5
To be an effective defense lawyer, however, more is required thanjust
a positive, caring attitude. I worked hard to polish my analytical skills
and my trial abilities to enable me to challenge the State more vigor-
ously. Most of my fellow public defenders in the Milwaukee office
readily embraced the heroic image of the defense lawyer sworn to battle
the State regardless of the odds or the abhorrent nature of the crimes
with which our clients were charged. Heroism motivated us to become
more competent lawyers. 2 6 The better we got, the more confident we
became both in our abilities and in ourjudgment. Our clients generally
reaped the benefits of our greater skill.
Like Ogletree and his colleagues at the Public Defender Service in
Washington, D.C., many of the public defenders in our office tried to
project a lawyering style that combined the best aspects of the tradi-
tional and client-centered approach. Indeed, even after leaving the
Milwaukee Public Defender's Office, I have continued to practice and
teach an approach that blends heroism with empathy. There are times,
however, when those attitudes or motivations directly clash and simply
cannot be reconciled. Like defense counsel in this variation of the
Brown case, I have been forced to choose whether to pursue a winning
strategy or to respect my client's foolhardy strategic choice. Despite
wanting to be the instrument and defender of my client's autonomy, I
dedication and commitment of many criminal defense lawyers). Admittedly, not all criminal defense
lawyers share this attitude. See MCINTYRE, sura note 210; Michael McConville & Chester L. Mirsky,
Criminal Defnse qf the Poor in New York City, 15 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 581 (1986-87). Horror
stories abound about incompetent defense lawyers who seemingly do not care or, at least, do not care
enough. Among the many commentators who have discussed the problem oflack ofzeal in the criminal
defense bar, see David Luban, Are Criminal Defenders Different?, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1729, 1762 (1993);
Stephen B. Bright, Counselfor the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103
YALE LJ. 1835 (1994); Uphoff, supra note 253, at 425-47; Alschuler, supra note 216, at 1179-1270.
284. See, e.g., Smith & Montross, supra note 199, at 444-46 (discussing the hostility directed against
criminal defendants). Moreover, as Smith and Montross point out, not only are criminal defendants
demonized, so too are the lawyers who defend them. Id. at 446-51.
285. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 763 (1983) (Brennan,J., dissenting).
286. See Ogletree, supra note 35, at 1275-78 (discussing heroism and detailing the extent to which the
"hero" mentality motivates public defenders to battle the State on behalf of their underdog clients).
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personally find it very hard to let those I care about harm themselves.2"7
Ironically, the more empathetic a lawyer becomes-committed to
helping indigent defendants, seeing them as special friends in need,
worrying about their lives beyond their cases-the more that lawyer
feels her clients' pain. It can be gut-wrenching to see a client you care
about lose and suffer the consequences. It can be even worse if the
client's harm was preventable but for counsel's willingness to respect the
client's freedom to be foolish.
There is another reason I personally find it difficult to empower my
clients to make foolhardy decisions. At bottom, most defendants-
although, admittedly, not all-are not as interested in their freedom of
choice as they are in their freedom. That is, if most clients were asked
which they valued more-freedom of choice or winning at trial-most
clients would select winning.288 Many clients just lack confidence in
their lawyers and the strategic choices those lawyers are making.
Defendants who truly trust and have confidence in their lawyer do not
generally demand the same control over case decisions as those who fear
that their lawyer's inexperience, lack of zeal, excessive caseload, or
incompetence compromises counsel's recommendations.289 Thus,
clients want decisionmaking power, not for the sake of having control
over their cases, but because they ultimately want to win.
I want my clients to win almost as badly-and, in some instances,
even more29 -- than they do. Thus, the more confident I am in the
wisdom of my strategy or of the folly of my client's, the more discourag-
ing it is not to be able to convince a client to follow my recommended
strategy. So I push the defendant as forcefully as I can to persuade the
client of the merits of my preferred strategy. I do so, however, without
287. See Ross, supra note 201, at 1375-76 (concluding that her ethics of care perspective requires her
to override the value of autonomy in order to save her clients from self-destruction).
288. See Smith, supra note 216, at 31 (discussing tension between client autonomy and lawyer
responsibility and suggesting that defendants' primary concern is to stay out ofjail or, at least, get out as
soon as possible). That is not to say that clients care only about case outcomes. Research suggests that
clients care about the manner in which they were treated by their lawyer and the system. See, e.g.,
JONATHAN D. CASPER, CRIMINAL COURTS: THE DEFENDANT'S PERSPECTIVE (1978); Clark D.
Cunningham, Evaluating Effective Lawyer-Client Communication: An International Project Moving From Research To
Refonn, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1959, 1959-65 (1999). Other clients worry more about process costs orjust
getting their case over with quickly. See MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT:
HANDLING CASES INA LOWER CRIMINAL COURT 216-22 (1979). Finally, some clients do care more about
how their story is told or what tactics are used to secure a victory. See Christopher P. Gilkerson, Poverty Law
Narratives: The Critical Practice and Theoy of Receiving and Translating Client Stories, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 861, 916
.(1992).
289. COCHRANJR., Er AL., supra note 19, at 115-17; Flemming, supra note 211, at 274-75.
290. It is not uncommon to Find defendants, especially in misdemeanor cases, more concerned with
getting a case over than in securing the optimum result. See FEELEY, supra note 288, at 221-22.
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employing dishonest or unduly coercive tactics.91 If the client remains
adamant, I look at the same four factors discussed in the first scenario
before deciding whether to respect that client's right to be foolhardy.
In this scenario, Brown undoubtedly is a competent decisionmaker,
capable of making an informed choice. Despite his general intelligence
and capacity for rational choice, however, his reasoning in this variation
of the case is badly flawed. Because he is misreading the situation,
Brown also fails to appreciate the long odds against him if his strategy
were to be followed. Rather than seeing risk, Brown perceives that his
tactics maximize his chances for victory.
Counsel is quite confident, however, that Brown's strategy hurts the
defense. Without the father, the defendant's conviction is very likely.
In this case, there is no ambiguity in judging the relative merits of either
strategy. Indeed, the more confident counsel is of the advantages of a
particular strategy, the less open counsel should be to abandoning that
strategy. Similarly, the more counterproductive or harmful that the
client's proposed tactics are, the less inclined counsel should be to permit
the client to pursue those tactics.
In addition, the father's testimony is pivotal in this case. Thus, the
disputed tactical choice is very likely to determine the outcome of the
trial. In this scenario, then, deferring to Brown's strategy virtually
guarantees that Brown will be harmed by his choice. Fortunately, the
resulting damage to the client-a misdemeanor conviction and a fine or
short jail sentence-is relatively minor. In this variation of the Brown
case, therefore, I would opt to respect Brown's foolish choice and would
try the case without calling the father as a witness. My decision to do so,
however, rests primarily on the fact that Brown will only suffer limited
pain as a consequence of our respective choices.
The defendant's right to make foolish strategic choices, in my view,
is not unbounded. Rather, the defendant's personal circumstances or
those of the case may require that the client's freedom to be wrong be
restricted. Counsel ultimately has the responsibility to determine how
far to go in permitting a client to exercise strategic decisionmaking
authority.
In my view, thejudgment required of counsel is much like that facing
the parent of a teenage child.292 Parents are responsible for safeguarding
291. The line between hard persuasion and coercion is a subtle, imprecise one. See White, supra note
210, at 371-73; supra note 216. A discussion of that important distinction also is beyond the scope of this
article.
292. Indeed, it is much like the judgment demanded by Model Rule 1.14 when a lawyer is
considering whether to respect the decisions ofan impaired person. See MODELRUIES OFPROFEFSSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 1.14 (1989). Rule 1.14 requires lawyers to strive to maintain a normal client-lawyer
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their child's welfare, but also for helping their child grow into a
responsible adult. Good parents must teach their children about
judgment and increasingly give their children more freedom to control
their lives. Teenage children, especially older ones, not only must make
many decisions, but generally start to demand even more freedom.
Parents, however, ultimately must decide- how far to go in respecting the
decisions of their children.
Good parents frequently find it necessary to impose their will on their
child for the child's own good. Indeed, it is difficult for many parents to
stop making decisions for their children for fear that, even as teenagers,
their children will make poor, unduly risky decisions and harm
themselves. Yet caring parents also recognize that they cannot
constantly make all decisions for their children. If a child is to grow into
a mature, responsible adult, the child must be given the power to make
decisions for himself or herself.
For the parent that means creating an environment that allows the
child to start exercising increased control over decisions. Learning to
make decisions like learning other skills-walking, riding a bike,
swimming-entails making mistakes and learning from those mistakes.
Making mistakes in the learning process also involves some pain. Good
parents recognize that being overprotective may stifle their child's
growth. Albeit hard, good parents allow their child's learning-and the
mistakes-to go on while trying to minimize the child's pain and to
avoid any permanent harm to the child in the process.
The judgment called for in good parenting with respect to
decisionmaking, then, is similar to the judgment required of the good
lawyer regarding a client's decisionmaking. Given the special
responsibilities of the attorney-client relationship, it is understandable
that counsel wants to protect her client from any harm. Like parents,
lawyers often feel the need to assume decisionmaking control for the
relationship and to abide by a client's decisions as far as reasonably possible. See id. See also, e.g., In Re M.R.,
638 A.2d 1274, 1284-85 (N.J. 1994) (requiring a lawyer representing client with Down's Syndrome to
follow her wishes unless absurd or they present unreasonable risk of harm to her health, safety and welfare).
At times, however, the client will be insisting on action that counsel believes is contrary to the client's best
interests. Although all concede that the lawyer's position is "an unavoidably difficult one," see MODEL
RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.14 cmt. (1989), scholars disagree as to counsel's role in this
situation. See, e.g., Paul Tremblay, On Persuasion and Paternalism: Laeyer Decisionmaking and the Questionaby
Competent Client, 1987 UTAH L. REV. 515. No matter how counsel decides to proceed, she will be called
upon to exercise sound professional judgment and to balance certain risks and competing interests before
responding to the client's wishes. In some circumstances, albei.t not clearly defined, counsel is permitted
to take "protective action" if the client wants to proceed in a manner seemingly contrary to the client's own
interests." MODEL RULIS OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.14(b). Similarly, the student in Brown
must decide whether to honor his client's foolish strategy or to take protective action by overriding his
client's wishes.
826
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client's own good. Yet clients, like teenage children, often feel quite
capable of making their own choices and clamor for the right to do so.
Lawyers like parents will struggle to know when to grant their clients
that freedom to act for fear that the clients will make poor decisions and
harm themselves.
Unlike parents, a lawyer's special responsibility does not continue
beyond the case itself. And, unlike parents, it is not essential that the
lawyer teach one's clients about decisionmaking.293 Nevertheless, in the
face of similar client and child demands for the freedom to control their
lives, both good lawyers and good parents ought to be motivated to give
wing to their clients' and their childrens' aspirations to fly. For parents,
permitting a child decisionmaking experience is critical if the parents are
to guide their child's development toward autonomy. For a lawyer,
respect for the individual-and his or her autonomy-is "the lifeblood
of the law." '294
In the end, both good lawyers and wise parents are required to
exercise the same sort ofjudgment in deciding whether to allow their
child or client the freedom to fly. They must scrutinize each flight-or
important decisionmaking situation-to determine if the circumstances
warrant allowing the client or child the room to fall or to crash. In some
instances, the risk of harm is too great and the parent or lawyer cannot
allow the child or client the freedom to act. But just as the
overprotective parent stifles the child's ability to grow, the unduly
paternalistic lawyer stifles a client's individual autonomy.295 Each must
strive to achieve the proper balance.
Changing the facts of the Brown case, therefore, may lend to different
resolutions of this strategic impasse. If, for example, Brown was mildly
retarded and only marginally competent, counsel should be more
inclined to override Brown's wishes regarding an important witness.296
If Brown's father was only a minor witness, however, then counsel
should be more willing to tolerate Brown's proposed foolish tactic.
Similarly, counsel should be more willing to respect the client's choice
293. Although the general experience of taking responsibility for important decisions may serve the
client well, a lawyer's responsibility does not extend to training clients to be better decisionmakers. But see
SHAFTER & COCHRAN,JR., supra note 1I, at 40-135 (arguing that lawyers should be concerned with client
goodness and help the clients to make sound moral decisions).
294. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 351 (1970) (Brennan,J., concurring).
295. The use of the term "unduly" means, of course, that I believe that in some instances, lawyers
arejustified in being paternalistic. I am not claiming, however, that lawyers generally have the right to
control their client's lives or define their best interests. Rather, I am arguing that with respect to strategic
decisionmaking, lawyer paternalism is warranted in some circumstances.
296. See RodneyJ. Uphoff, The Role of the Criminal Defense Lttyer in Representing the Mentally Impaired
DefendanL Zealous Advocate or Offer ofthe Court?, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 65, 98-108.
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in situations in which counsel is less confident of the comparative
advantages of her preferred approach. Say, for example, the lead
defense lawyer believes that Brown's father is a good, but not great,
witness. One of the other defense lawyers working on the case shares
her assessment while the other is much more ambivalent. In such a
situation, the ambiguity of the optimal strategy makes it far easier to
respect the client's proposed choice, even though that choice is contrary
to lead counsel's advice.
Finally, as my resolution of this scenario reflects, it is easier to respect
a client's poor strategic choice when the harm the client is likely to suffer
is minimal. Conversely, the harsher the consequences facing the client,
the more difficult it becomes for counsel to allow a client the freedom to
be foolish. This is especially so if counsel also is confident that her
strategic choice is sound and that the client's choice is very likely to
produce those negative results.
Assume, for example, that defense counsel was defending Brown on
a murder charge. Assume also that all the other facts of this scenario
remain unchanged. That is, Brown still insists that his father not be
called as a witness. How should counsel respond to the client's right to
be foolhardy in this instance?
Brown should be told that, in view of the severity of the punishment
facing him, counsel will not allow Brown to pursue a strategy that
counsel firmly believes is harmful. In advising Brown that defense
counsel's decision regarding the father ultimately controls,297 counsel
should attempt to minimize damage to the attorney-client relationship
and to facilitate the successful implementation of counsel's strategy.
This will not be easy. Imposing one's will on another often causes
bruised feelings or resentment.29
Invariably, if counsel's strategy were to pay off and Brown were to
win at trial, Brown's bruised feelings likely would be assuaged. 299  If
Brown is convicted, however, counsel undoubtedly would be subjected
to even more criticism and second-guessing for overriding Brown's
297. It would be improper for a lawyer in North Carolina to render this advice or to override the
client's wishes in this situation because settled caselaw clearly gives the defendant the final say when lawyer
and client are at an absolute impasse over a strategic decision. See supra notes 174-78 and accompanying
text.
298. Clients - like children and horses - often chafe at the bit. All parents have had the unpleasant
experience of telling a child no with the final explanation being "because I say so" or "because it's for your
own good." Frequently that message, regardless of its truth, fails to satisfy or to ease the child's hurt
feelings.
299. But see Cunningham, supra note 202, at 1328-31, 1366-87 (using the Dujon Johnson case to
demonstrate that for some clients winning may not be as important as being treated with dignity and
respect).
828
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wishes. Most experienced lawyers recognize that such criticism goes
with thejob. For the conscientious lawyer, neither fear of such criticism
nor concerns about the client's hurt feeling deters her from making the
tough call to override a client's unsound strategic demand when such a
call is warranted.
This does not mean that counsel's willingness to tolerate a defendant's
foolish strategic decision depends solely on the amount of harm that the
client faces. Unquestionably, it is harder to let a client be wrong when
the price of foolishness is so high. Yet, the likelihood of the harm and
the reasons for the client's decision also are salient factors. For example,
it may be appropriate for counsel to respect an unwise strategic
maneuver, even though the potential consequences are grave, in a case
in which that maneuver is based on the client's heartfelt desire to avoid
subjecting his father to the risk of a heart attack. On the other hand,
there are situations where the risk of disaster is simply too great to
permit the client to pursue a foolhardy tactic regardless of the client's
motivation. Counsel need not-and should not-respect a client's
suicidal tactics. 00
3. The Uncommunicative Objective
In the final scenario, assume that when the defense lawyer called
Brown to tell him of the prosecutor's decision to retry the case, Brown
advised counsel that his father simply would not be testifying in the
subsequent trial. Defense counsel's attempt to press Brown for an
explanation proved futile. In following discussions, counsel's efforts to
300. Indeed, many lawyers who do death penalty defense work contend that allowing defendants to
block the presentation of mitigating evidence and to argue for the imposition of the death penalty is akin
to assisting defendants to commit suicide. See, e.g., Welsh S. White, Defendants Who Elect Execution, 48 U.
PITT. L. REV. 853,855-61 (1987). A number ofcourts and commentators agree and take the position that
counsel should introduce mitigating evidence despite defendant's objection. See, e.g., People v. Deere, 710
P.2d 925, 930 (Cal. 1985) (en bane); State v. Hightower, 518 A.2d 482, 483 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1986); People v. Koedatch, 548 A.2d 939,992-97 (NJ. 1988); Linda E. Carter, MaintainingSystenicntegri!y
in Capital Cases: The Use of Court-Appointed Counsel to Present MitigatingEvidence When the Defendant Advocates Death,
55 TENN. L. REV. 95 (1987). Other courts and commentators, however, contend that a defendant should
have the right to prevent defense counsel from introducing mitigating evidence even if it means ensuring
the imposition of a death sentence. See, e.g., People v. Silagy, 461 N.E.2d 415, 430-32 (Ill. 1984); State v.
Felde, 422 So. 2d 370, 393-95 (La. 1982); Autry v. McKaskle, 727 F.2d 358, 361-62 (5th Cir. 1984) cerL
denied, 465 U. 1085 (1984); Bonnie, supra note 279, at 1367-90. Not surprisingly, then, some lawyers will
follow a client's instructions even if that means arguing for or attempting to secure a death penalty. See
Mark Hansen, Death's Advocate, A.B.A.J., Dec. 1998, at 22 (reporting on lawyer's attempt to secure a
criminal defendant's desired result: a death sentence). No matter how one comes out on this difficult issue,
however, complying with a competent defendant's deliberate choice regarding the defense of the penalty
phase of a capital trial is different from respecting a defendant's misconceived strategic choice regarding
the conduct of a trial.
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raise the matter were met with a change of subject, silence and,
ultimately, with Brown's persistent refusals to discuss his father in any
way. Although the client willingly and reasonably talked about other
aspects of the upcoming trial, he brusquely cut off any communications
about the father. Responding to counsel's request to talk personally
with the father, Brown abruptly told her no. Brown insisted that counsel
forget about the father and instead worry about the trial. Counsel also
tried pointing out the negative effect that the father's absence would
have on Brown's chances of success at trial, but the client shrugged off
counsel's concerns. Despite defense counsel's insistence that without the
father Brown faced long odds at trial, the defendant asked only that
counsel take "her best shot" at trial. Brown refused to be drawn into
any further discussions about the father. Should counsel proceed to trial
without calling the father or take some other course of action?
There are times when the defendant's refusal to communicate or to
discuss issues with counsel is so serious that counsel must consider
dramatic action. Dramatic action, however, is not called for in this
scenario. This is not a case in which counsel must decide whether to.
challenge the defendant's competency.3"' Brown is not incompetent nor
is he only marginally competent. Nor is this a case in which the
attorney-client relationship has deteriorated to the point that counsel is
warranted in moving to withdraw. Certainly there are cases in which
the communication problems between counsel and a client are so
pronounced, that counsel should go to the court and ask for leave to
withdraw as counsel. Rather, this is a case in which the client is
purposefully cutting off communication with counsel about a limited,
but highly relevant, matter for some unknown and unstated reason or
reasons.
Brown's refusal to discuss this matter is hurtful but not fatal to the
attorney-client relationship. Criminal defense lawyers, especially
appointed counsel, frequently have to work with clients who have
difficulty making themselves understood or who choose to make
communication difficult. Despite counsel's best efforts, a client simply
may not be interested in establishing a meaningful relationship with
defense counsel." 2 Nonetheless, counsel must strive to provide his or
her client the best representation possible under the circumstances, even
in the face of the client's own obstructive behavior.
301. For a look at defense counsel's role when representing a defendant ofquestionable competence,
see generally Uphoff, supra note 296.
302. Although criminal defendants are not guaranteed the right to a meaningful attorney-client
relationship, see Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1983), good lawyers strive to create such relationships.
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As in the other two scenarios, the criminal practitioner in this
variation of the case understandably hesitates to ratify a decision that
will hurt Brown's chances for success at trial. It is particularly difficult
to agree to a harmful strategy when the client refuses to offer any
explanation to support such a strategy. Perhaps earlier conversations
with Brown about his father, observations about the father based on
prior contacts, or revelations by Brown about himself may provide
counsel come clues to help her unlock the mystery. Absent such clues,
counsel is left to speculate about the reasons for Brown's obstinate
position.
Even though Brown may have very legitimate reasons for preferring
to proceed to trial without the benefit of his father, counsel may find
Brown's failure to communicate those reasons quite frustrating.
Certainly defense counsel will be tempted to respond to the client's
stubbornness by simply announcing her intent to exercise her authority
over strategic decisions and to call the father to testify despite Brown's
wishes. Given the circumstances of this case, however, counsel should
resist the temptation to save Brown from his own stubbornness. In view
of Brown's attitude, resolving this clash of wills by trying to force Brown
to accept counsel's strategic choice is very likely to rupture the attorney-
client relationship and drive Brown to ask-probably unsuccessfully 3° 3-
for new counsel.
Assuming that the trial judge denies Brown's request for a new
lawyer, counsel will be going to trial with an angry client and little
assurance that counsel's strategic choice will actually benefit the
defendant. Brown's father, in fact, may be unavailable to testify. If
available, he may be quite hostile either because he was the driving
force behind Brown's insistence he not be called or because he now
shares his son's anger. Hostile defense witnesses are seldom very helpful.
Moreover, even if the father does testify and performs well, Brown
may still be quite angry with counsel. His anger may interfere with
counsel's trial preparation as well as adversely affect Brown's testimony
and overall demeanor at the trial. In the unlikely event that the case is
won or hung again, Brown's anger will likely dissipate. It is more likely,
however, that defense counsel's efforts to "save" the client from himself
by imposing counsel's strategic choice on an unwilling defendant, will
only have made matters worse. The defendant not only will lose at trial,
but his wishes will have been disrespected in the process.
303. Courts are reluctant to grant indigent defendants new counsel because of disagreements over
strategy. See, e.g., People v. Schultheis, 638 P.2d 8, 11-14 (Colo. 1981). This is particularly so close to trial.
Defendants and their lawyers generally are warned to work things out.
HeinOnline  -- 68 U. Cin. L. Rev. 831 1999-2000
UNIVERSITY OF CIACINNA TI LA W REVIEW [Vol.68
On the other hand, some lawyers may choose to respond to an
uncommunicative client insistent upon a foolish strategy by too quickly
giving in to the client's poor choice.30 4  Like over-permissive or
uninvolved parents, some lawyers are too eager to please and too willing
to accommodate their client's foolishness. They will not invest the time
and the energy needed to dissuade a client from making a poor strategic
choice. Like parents overanxious to avoid any confrontation or
argument with their aggressive teenager, counsel may find it easier or
less bothersome simply to allow the insistent client to have his own way.
Indeed, a client's belligerent attitude does make it easier for counsel to
adopt a laissez faire mentality toward the client. Nonetheless, lawyers
should not shirk their responsibility to try to reason through the problem
with the client and guide the client to the best decision despite the
client's attitude.
So too, frustration with the Brown's uncommunicative attitude ought
not cause counsel to respond in anger. The defendant is not well-served
if counsel accedes to Brown's wishes in a disrespectful manner. Rather
counsel should advise Brown of her resolution of their strategic impasse
in a manner that facilitates the possibility of future discussion and
reconsideration. Thus, Brown should be told that counsel is
disappointed with Brown's refusal to confide in her the defendant's
reasons for not wanting his father called as a witness. Absent such an
explanation, counsel cannot help but conclude that Brown's strategy is
misguided. Nonetheless, despite their strategic disagreement, counsel
should tell Brown she is deferring to the defendant's foolhardy strategy
because it is Brown's case.
Having provided Brown this explanation, defense counsel will be in
a better position, as she continues her trial preparations, to press Brown
to reconsider his decision. Perhaps, impressed by counsel's willingness
to respect his choice, Brown may come to trust counsel enough either to
open up and explain the problem or even change his strategic choice.
If not, and counsel goes to trial without the father and loses, then Brown
will sustain some harm. Fortunately, the harm is minimal in this case.
Thus, counsel's decision to respect Brown's choice may not leave Brown
any worse off-or only somewhat so-but it is likely to leave him
satisfied with counsel's representation.
A review of the four factors discussed in the previous scenarios
supports the merits of such an approach in this variation of the case. As
304. See Blanco v. Singletary, 943 F.2d 1477, 1503 (11 th Cir. 1991) (finding defense counsels were
ineffective because "[t]he ultimate decision that was reached not to call witnesses was not a result of
investigation and evaluation, but was instead primarily a result ofcounsels' eagerness to latch onto Blanco's
statements that he did not want any witnesses called").
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in the other scenarios, Brown undoubtedly is a competent
decisionmaker. In all other respects, he has responded appropriately
and reasonably to counsel when they have discussed other aspects of the
case. Except for his reluctance to use his father as a witness, Brown
appears-to understand the information provided him and to process it
in a manner consistent with informed decisionmaking. Thus, even
though Brown has not offered any explanation for his position, counsel
has no basis for concluding that the defendant's unstated reasons are
irrational. Absent evidence to the contrary, counsel should give her
client the benefit of the doubt and assume that Brown has some
justification for his stance.
Even assuming that Brown's unstated justification has some merit,
however, this factor cannot be accorded much weight. More significant
is the fact that the client's unsound strategic choice is highly likely to
lead directly to a guilty verdict. Thus, respecting the defendant's
preferred strategy means allowing the defendant to suffer harm that
counsel may well be able to prevent. Empathy makes it hard for counsel
to let irrational clients injure themselves. It is not appreciably easier to
permit stubborn, uncommunicative clients to do so. Fortunately, the
nature of this case and Brown's personal circumstances are such that the
harm he will suffer is quite minor. As in the other two scenarios, then,
a balancing of these four factors leads to the conclusion that counsel
should respect Brown's wishes and not attempt to call the father to
testify.
Counsel's willingness to respect an uncommunicative client's
insistence on a foolish strategic maneuver should be tempered with
caution. Even in the case just discussed, it may be appropriate for the
defense lawyer to override Brown's wishes if, for example, she
reasonably suspects that the defendant's stance is based on his fear of his
father. Counsel should not permit another person - including a parent -
to bully a client into a poor strategic decision."°5 Counsel must
scrutinize carefully Brown's lack of communication for any evidence of
undue outside pressure before respecting the defendant's wishes.
In addition, as in the case of the irrational client, raising the
consequences of the client's foolishness increases the likelihood that
counsel will find it necessary to trump her client's strategic choice.
305. Good lawyering demands not only that counsel provide candid, independent advice, but that
counsel insulate a client, as much as possible, from the undue influence ofother persons. See MODELCODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-107(B); EC 5-1; EC 5-21 (1980); MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.4(c) (1989). For a look at the difficulty ofcounsel's role when the person
applying undue pressure is a parent, see Wallace J. Mlyniec, Who Decides: Decision Making in Juvenile
Delinquenty Proceedings, in ETHICAL PROBLEMS FACING THE CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYER: PRACTICAL
ANSWERS TO TOUGH QUESTIONS 105 (RodneyJ. Uphoff ed., 1995).
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Thus, if all of the facts remained the same except that Brown were
facing a serious felony charge, then defense counsel would be hard
pressed to respect Brown's dubious tactical choice. In such a case,
Brown's failure to articulate ajustification for his strategy would dictate
that counsel attempt to call the father regardless of the likely damage to
the attorney-client relationship.
V. CONCLUSION
As the lawyer handling the Brown case discovered, the criminal
defense lawyer locked in a dispute with a client over the decision to call
a particular witness faces a difficult choice. On the one hand, counsel
can exercise professional control and make the decision that maximizes
the defendant's chances to win at trial despite the defendant's objections.
Alternatively, counsel can respect the defendant's wishes and follow his
suggested tactical choice even though doing so may seriously harm the
defendant.
Agreeing to a tactic that is harmful to one's own case is difficult for
most lawyers to swallow, especially for those criminal defense lawyers
who feel that the deck is already stacked against their clients. Counsel's
sense of craft, her interest in her own reputation, and her ego also make
it difficult to accept a counter productive strategy. Losing is hard
enough. Not taking one's best shot is even harder for most highly
competitive trial lawyers. It is particularly hard to watch a client you
have fought for and care about injury himself.
Yet for the lawyer who values individual autonomy, respect for the
client requires that the client be afforded the right to be foolish or
wrong. That right is not, in my view, absolute. Rather, the good
lawyer, like the good parent, will struggle to balance the client's freedom
of choice with the lawyer's duty to prevent clients from inflicting harm
upon themselves. Respecting client decisionmaking means allowing
some defendant's to suffer the consequences of their foolhardy strategy.
In some instances, however, conscientious counsel should weigh the
factors discussed in this article and override the defendant's strategic
wishes.
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